Please wait. Contacting image service... loading

Article text

THE RELATIONS OP RUSSIA WITH
. ; TOLAND.
«rwwnTn ON POLAND, PRESENTED TO THE
^EMPEHOR SANDER BY M. POZZO DI
BOROO. . . ,
SIRE-As your Imperial Majesty bas
manded me to express my opinion as
future fate and government of Poland,
before your Majesty the result of my :
tions, with all the feelings, and I ma
terrors, with which the greatness and
culty of the question inspire me.
Those who professed to reduce this imri
question to a mere assertion of the gc
principles of abstract justice, and those
i : put forward their desires for the happinc
? the Polish nation as the means of obtainii
appear to me neither to have .comprehe
the vastness of the question,, nor to hav
lowed out the external relations by which
complicated; To judge truly it is nocessn
avoid the passionate enthusiasm of the
and íthe possibly, exaggerated, 'fears of
others. It is in such a spirit,-and after1
? precautions, that I venture to lay before
.". these humble considerations.
, ^Ybvir Majesty proposes to establish in Pc
? i.i a national government under your own in
? diate and sovereign authority, to restore't(
' portion of the nation which'.has fallen , u
your, dominion 'the right of 'making its
laws, administering its finances, arranging
own internal affairs, and! keeping on foe
army of, its 'own. You 'desire" to^emove J
its territory all 'the fbrbign 'troopsj that
.; ! say, all the troops which aro exclusively '.
' sian. You desire, in a word,' to consti
Poland'a separate state. , , ' '
Before expressing ah/opinion upon the
dom of a revolution so'complete, one must
care not to lose sight of the starting poin
mean, siro,, tho . condition at the present
ment of thé Polish nation, and of; all that wi
is included-under the name ofPoland.
There are 0,000,000 in the provinces of
thuania, Volhynia, and Podolia, who have I
1 subject to thegerhpire, and, governed by
Crown of Russia, for a*considerable period,
'There are 4,000,000 who have become 1
trian , subjects, situated principally along
frontier bf Hungary, which is at the same t
the most essential part of that empire, and
parttho most difficult'to preserve. '.'
i*.There is another portion,"'designated as
Duchy of Warsaw, arid comprising tho cápi
habituated to a particular form of governmi
created in a spirit of hostility to Russia,
with the purpose of bringing all the other p¡
of Poland'into the' samo system. \
' Lastly, there is a fraction much, smaller tl
. .the others allotted to Prussia for the secu
'and convenience of communication amor,
her provinces. , ;
Such being tho condition "of what once .
Poland, it results that every fundamental rt
sure of policy applied to this country m
affect essentially-. ' ' j
First, the interests of Austriaand of Pms
directly, and indirectly those of the ,Pow
allied to them.
In the second place, the interests of Bus
.considered as a dominant empire, having
fight to a certain preference in every decis
taken by its chief. j
Lastly, the happiness of Poland itself, as
AS it is practicable under the circumstan
, and in the situation in which it is placed.
It cannot be denied that ¿very effort of I
Poles, since 1702, to establish an independí
government, has been accompanied: by effo
to excite their fellow-countrymen tb throw,
the various foreign, dominations to which tl:
are subject, and to form ono grand and co
pact nation. Such a feeling ought to aston i
noone; it is in conformity with tho nature
men and things. But the result is'that frc
the moment that a diet, a representation, a:
a Polish army exist, a standard will be unfurl
and a rallying .point found for all t
, fragments of Poland. Austria and Pruss
' would be unable to conceal frc
themselves tho consequences of su
an establishment : the mere fact
its existence would in their oyes place thc
Polish subjects in a stato of permanent insi:
rection. Under these circumstances the
powers would unito to oppose a danger whii
would be common to both of thom. Wlieth
they should seek to preserve their acquisition
or, sacrificing these, should seek as a com pe
sation tho final and absolute independence
Poland, and the consequent weakening of tl
Russian empire, in either case all their effor
would tend to this ond.
The King of Prussia certainly is nearly coi
nectod with your Majesty. But let us suppo;
that that monarch should be able to obtain I
treaty all the objects of his ambition ; let i
suppose that tho cold calculations of in tere
should prevail in his cabinet at a momoi
\ when tho security of his states was con
promised ; lot us add the possibility of a no
, reign, a consideration which should never b
.omitted in matters of state, . and I have n
doubt that Prussia would regulate her condui
according to hor interests without any regai
to tho memory of past benefits. Englan
would support such a coursé without hesitatioi
and France would profit by tho opportunity a
? soon as division should be sown amongst tb
other powers. '
. Your Majesty sees clearly that in this eas
Russia would bo isolated, without being abl
even to count on Poland, who, seduced by th
hope of perfcot independence, would think :
, her interest to join the rest of Europe, or, pe:
Imps, would bo divided into factions, excited b
' tlie form of government promised to her, an
\ by tho impatlonce of the Polish patriots, fae
tions that foreign influences would not fail t
foment.
Nor ar these moro conjectures. Your Ms
J03ty sees springing up before your oyes th
germs of bloody conflicts ¡ you soo them in th
.opon opposition which you oncountor in all tin
! «abinots of Europe without exception.^ If yoi
?triumph, the momontary dofoat of tho othe:
Powers will only sorvo to unite them mon
closely. It is a sorious mistake in politics tc
croate universal and permanent intorosts ir
opposition to oneself. Tho powor of such c
oausoi is usually irresistible ; it Suspends thc
rivalries of tho most joolous courts, unites those
that' aro most divided, nnd lovols obstados
« Which soom insurmountable.
Your Majesty supposes that tho now oxist
onco which you destino for Poland will, on tho
. contrary, calm Inqulotudos, espoolally aftor the
Russian troops havo rotirod within their
anolent frontier. But this hypothesis would
only bo realised If tho oxamplo of 0,000,000 of
Poles, forming a distinct nation, and having a
Government of their own, could bo seen with
indifference by thoso who romain subjeot to
Austria and Prussia, and if thero wore no dosign
amongst the formor to draw to thom the
latter, and no desire amongst the lntter to join
themselves to their brothers, things which
one could venture to assume. Besides, 200;
Russian bayonets placed behind tho Polee
?watch that they governed themselves fre
?wisely, and moderately, will always be regar
as being in a position contrary to their i
mission.
Such are the most prominent objectic
Sire, to the project for the restoration
Poland, considered in its relations to fore
Powers. Those which might result to
empire of' your Majesty in general seem to
of a nature still more delicate.
This part of ,the question offers difficult
of a very different kind to those who are :
afraid to investigate them. In fact, how ii
possible to suppose that your Majesty co:
desire anything contrary to the interests
your empire ; your Majesty, who has carr
its glory and splendour to the highest poi
who has taught it the secrot of its power, o
,wh'o, having., made it dominant,! in Euro
labours to prescribe the limits of wisdom to
power.'Ui'Moreover; such > is the singularity
this' affair; that it is indispensable to prest
it even to your Majesty under this point
/view,,,!., A --'-A
. ; .The conduct of Russia: towards¡.Pola
hrs - always been that; of - a; strong and vig
'ons c government. ; toward? another whi
has, i'neither 'force , nor, vigour., I; Let
picture, to : ourselves a , nation demoralis
by boundless political corruption, a pi
to factionsj' and'tearing itself to pieces -with
own hands, placed by thé side of a rival natit
which, directed byia strong and able govei
mont, follows ' out a plan of aggrandiseme
' clearly,' marked 'out;; possessing an army, in
state of. perfect discipline, and which, train
to obedience and full of courage, ,is susceptil
at once of submission and enthusiasm, it w
not be difficult to foresee the destiny of ea
of these, nations. ' He who could be astonish
at whnt has befallen the Poles, or I rather
what their divisions have brought upon the:
selves, must be entirely ignorant of the boi
of, history.; [' :,'."'".'. '
The destruction of the political existence
Poland, forms the entire modern history
Russia. Tho system of aggrandisement <
tlie 3ido"of Turkey has been merely territpri
-I might say secondary-compared! with th
which has, been carried out on the wostei
frontier. ' The conquest of Poland 'hos bd<
made principally for the sake of multiply'u
tho relations of Russia with tlie oth^r natioi
of Europe, and to open to iher a vaster, fie
and a more noble stage for the exercise of li
power and her talents, tind "for the satisfactic
of her pride, her passions, and herjinteresl
From this design, crowned as it has been 1
the most completo > success, habits have i
suited which it is impossible to efface by
mere proclamation, without injuring the' er
piro in its most essential and most delica
element; that of unity of government.; - '<
? The title of King of Poland will never be :
harmony with that of Emperor and Autocrat
all the Russias. They are two qualities .whit
are incompatible-they signify things ar
suppose functions so different that'tho san
sovereign could not unite thém without givin
dissatisfaction to one nation or the other, <
possibly to both.
Whatever may bo the motives and iwhatevi
the wisdom of conquests at the time they ai
made, their'preservation is of the utmoi
necessity when they have been inade an
universally recognised, especially if from the
nature and their importance they bear upo
the fundamental policy of the conquering stat
Tho Polish possessions incorporated in.Russi
are, in my opinion, of this character. 'I
divide thom by a sudden measure would be t
inflict disastrous changes upon the .whole con
position and oconomy of tho empire, and t
excite a moral opposition and differences <
opinion most injurious and most dangerous t
both nations.
In considering this project the mind ca:
scarcely concoivo how it would be possible, b
amere act, to separate so many province
from tho common administration of th
empire, for tho purpose of forming a:
independent state, which shall govern itsel
according to a stipulated system of liberty
which shall vote its own imposts and cxpem
them ; which shall create and have the control c
an army, at tho same time that its conqueror
will bo forced to withdraw in order to bo mer
spectators of this revolution, without oxcit¡n¡
disorder on tho part of-tho nowly onfranchisoi
and jealousy and disgust on tho part of you
ancient subjects. The contrast would in an;
case bo dangerous ; but it will seem very dan
gorous indeed if wo consider the differenco tho
it will establish between tho Russians and Un
Poles-tho formor, with a strong sense of thei:
own strongth, condomned to romain passive
while tho lattor, fooblo and inferior, will have i
free government in their own hands. If wi
add the petulance of triumphant vanity, whicl
superior freedom will induce, tho picture wil
bo complete
It is very possible that your Majosty in th
flower of your ago, crowned with success, ant
at tho head of Europe, will succeed in curbinj
by your influence and decision the movomonti
which would be attempted against the uev
order pf things; but to curb is not to oxtin
guish, and if those movements aro stimulated b;
interest and by passions, the same results wil
bo continually developing thomsolvos whehevo
any of those occasions whfch are frequonth
occurring in human affairs present thomsolvos
I have often heard it asserted that tho mosl
absoluto power1 can bo oxoreised in Russia
and that public opinion is of noweight or con
soquenco, and that tho Sovereign is, as it wore
the universal soul, communicating to the whole
nation, thought, word, and action. . My inox
podenco doos not permit mo to express an
opinion on this subject, but it can hardly bc
believod that tho general sources of good and
evil, working upon the common intorosts.uporj
tho pride and passions, upon the prejudices,
and upon the sentiment of nationality which
is so powerful amongst tho inhabitants of this
vast empire, would fail to produce tho samo re-
sults hore as elsewhere.
Those who sook to justify by example the
plan proposed by tho Polos often cito that of
Austria, of whioh tho Sovorolgn unites tho titles
of King of Bohomia and' of Hungary with that
ofEmporor, and governs in tranquillity under
thoso various titles.
Nothing is moro apt to confound tho judg-
ment than a similarity of names whoro there
is no real similarity in tho things thomsolvos.
Tho kingdoms of Bohomia and of Hungary
havo passed to tho Arohdukos of Austria by
succession. Tho adoption of tho tltlo was then
a necessary condition inhoront in tho naturo of
the acquired right and tho logitimaoy of its pos-
session. Austria was small and oonflnod, nnd
its Arohduko, in taking thoso titles, effected
(consacrait) mighty oonquosta. Tho Em
poror of Russia, on the contrary, In taking the
title of King óf Poland, renounced possessii
which were not oven aa inheritance, but wh
had been gained by force with the very r.
pose of aggrandisement and unity. Á volu
might be written on the difference of the 1
cases, which have nothing in common.
If there existed between Russia and the x
of Europe a civilized mass of nine millio
constituting one nation," the reciprocal
fluonce and communication of Russia a
¡Europe would insensibly diminish. 1
Russians, restrained within their ancient fri
tier, or merely passing it as travellers, woi
become almost unknown to the other natio
To withdraw Poland from under tho Impci
sceptre would be to compel the Russians
receive everything at second hand.
The hindrance which this separation woi
be to the .development of their moral faculti
to their education, to their participation in <
lightenment, . arts, and liberal ideas, is inc
eulabie. It was for the purpose of plungi
Russia for ever in barbarism,,and of renderi
,it, an exclusively Asiatio pawer',' that Ñapóle
imagined the.-restoration-''of Poland, as it \y
for the purpose of gaining for Russia a d
tinguished' placé 'amongst thetniost civilis
nations of r Europe that your, Majesty's préi
cessors desired conquests which must nee
sarily lead to contact with them. . ' ., :. . ,..>
" Par be it from me, Sire; to desire to agg
vate the misfortunes of Poland by, unnecessc
severity. . The question is. not! whether
possible good is to be conferred ' on the
That every'noble mind desires:. ;But the tr
problem for'a statesman consists iii combini
measures of, benevolence towards them ,wi
the general, interests and security . of yo
Majesty's empire. It is the firm convictii
that the plan-proposed by the Poles would i
jure both the one' and .the other that has d
tated the reflections ri have.made., ..' , ¡ .'.
I entreat your Majesty's permission.to ent
into an examination of the chances of succe
1 which this plan,offers, as,regards the effects
I will produce upon men's minds in Poland,, ai
! good or evil which will result from it to th
j country. .''.?',? . . . _ . » -
I No general reform, no political revolutit
has eyer prospered, save iii as,far as it w
I in accord with the .character., of tho pe
pie for which | it was designed, wi
the spirit of ? tho times; and with 'tl
circumstances in which the country was placé
and in as far as it was guaranteed from the i
fluence of neighbours who had an interest
destroying it. The reconstruction of Polai
would, in tho form in which' it. is solicited fro
your Majesty, be exposed to.dangers,; the mo
imminent. -. >?
The idea of independence amongst the Pol
arises not from cool reflection jtpprithoad va
tages of freedom, but from a feeling, natur
indeed, but vague, and influenced rather 1
hatred of foreigners than by love pf countr
Had this independence been à want foundc
on a solid and¡ enlightened patriotism, wou
they have trafficked with it in so disgraceful
manner during two centuries ? W"h'at secui'i
have we for their prudence and incorruptibili
for the future? . Why, if they were; fitted f
the form of government which they demand, d
they not tako measures with Buonaparte i
constitute themselves, not a military depai
ment of France, but a nation? Why did thc
not show some repugnance to marching to ci
the throats of tho Spaniards, instead <
making: libations and fêtes.,ùvéry timo that
regiment departed for the Pyrenees? Th
Poles, after having sacked Madrid and bun
Moscow, aim not, at their deliverance, but i
supremacy. In recalling thoso events I do nc
dosire to cast unnecessary odium upon them
but it is strange that they should I conside
themselves so strongly entitled to ¡our pit
(qu'ils viennent déclamer des drames J j for thei
misfortunes, in which there is nothing peet
liar, and nothing which has not been sufferec
by every people that has behaved in a simile
manner.
" Give us national independence, and w
will be moderato towards our neighbours, sin
cere friends to the Russians, and unitei
amongst ourselves." Such is the cry whicl
thoy unceasingly repeat.
Policy, guided by reason, would reply:
" Should you obtain your independence yoi
would not cease to bo what you wore before
you would retain your habitual hatred toward
tile Russians, which would be augmented b
your triumph. You would allow yourselves t
bo corrupted by the gold and by the intrigue
of those nations who desire to cause embaí
rassment to Russia. If you desire i
Polish army, however feeble it migh
be at first, ' you only desire it as i
defence against the Russian army. Yoi
would find your independence incom
pleto as often as tue King of Poland would no
sacrifico to you the Emperor of Russia. Yoi
would disturb the general policy of tho J3m
poror, by provoking revolts amongst yoi»
countrymen who aro subjects of Austria ant
Prussia. You would upset his plans and plací
him, by your turbulence, in constant ombar
rassments. Placed as you aro botwoen hin
and Europo, it would bo amongst you thal
every enterprise against him , was propared
To-day you may bo disaffected, but you arc
weak; all your fellow-countrymen are so too
and there is no diversity of interest respecting
you amongst tho great powers. But from thc
moment that you obtain tho independence you
seek, you would possess an active organisation
which would inevitably diverge from tho poll
tidal unity of Russia. Your prosent conduci
is noithor prudent nor dolicato. You have
scarcely perceived the generous and praise
worthy desire of improving your condition
. when you raise your tone, and loudly domand
your indopondenco. You dosiro to obtain it al
-any cost, and do not hesitate to compromiso youi
august protoctor with all Europe. You will
allow of no preparatory stops. You soek in
this revolution only your own advantage, and
put aside all consideration ns to what may bo the
result to others ; youoxactas a commencement
that which it may bs impossiblo to grant to you
as a ponoluslon. Tho title itsolf of .King ol
Poland ought to bo regarded as tho consecra-
tion 'of your nationality, and not morely as a
prolude to your national insurrection. If tho
Empor or once, adopts it, no rotroat romains
possible. You aro ignorant, then, how torrlblo
an orror it is in affairs of imraenso importance
to placo yoursolf in tho alternative of tho two
oxtromos, suocoss or failure And should tho
latter result, havo you thought of tho dire
nocossity of submitting to a second subjuga-
tion, and of sooing so groat gonorosity and
kindnoss terminating in a war of extermina-
tion ?
Such is tho languago that might bo hold to
tho Polos to chook tholr prldo and lossen their
exaltation, without diminishing :tho desiro or
tho means of conferring on .them all tho ad-
vantages whloh aro possiblo in the prosont
stato and disposition of Europe. In pursuing
the plans and generous intentions of your
Majesty on this important subject I will ex
pose the course which appears to me tho least
dangerous and the most reasonable :
1. To reduce the Polish question with foreign
powers to a mere question of limits, ? in that
spirit of wisdom and conciliation which so
eminently distinguishes .the political conduct
of your Majesty. . . ,., : ?
. 2. To characterize in tho treaties thenew acqui-
sitions as made for the benefit of your: Majesty
and your successors, and consequently as be-
longing to the Crown and empire of Russia in
complete and perpetual sovereignty.
3. To limit, at least for ' the moment, all
new organisation to these ' acquisitions exclu-
sively., '.,7' .':.~ ~lr : . . >'.!
4. To appoint an Imperial Lieutenant to
reside at Warsaw, with authority similar tb that
exercised by the King of England's Lord Lieu-
tenant in Ireland,' who shall, correspond with
your Majesty's ministryViiwithpu.t; tho creation
of a separate department for tho affairs of this
new portion pf the empire. r ; ", ' ?> '
\ S. To choose ¡from amongst the 'Poles the
majority of tho.,functionaries who, aro to act
under the orders of the Imperial. Lieutenant,
hut hot totally to exclude Russians. .
! 0; To announce tho benevolent; intentions'
of your . Majesty'in the usual .manner,- that; is
to.say, ;by ukase, as the .emanation of, your own
will, and to abstain from any pact or convention
? between'Sovereign and people whether called
by'the name,of a, constitution brby any other
name. - i In à case like this, where the govern-
ment, has need of immense power to enable
it'to do good; all -syhallagmatic forms weaken
its authority, and add nothing to the excellence
or to the strength of institutions.. ¡
This course, Sire, , it seems i to me
would '-prevent a great portion ¡ of . I the
incohyeniencies which we haVe 'reason to
dread, without placing any. obstacle in'the:
way of your Majesty's desire to ameliorate-gra-
dually the lot of your Polish subjects ; it would
partlyjCalm tho alarms' of foreign1 nations ; it
would, hot shock too abruptly.. the ' general
interests of your empire and the prejudices of
your Russian subjects ; it has the character of
a reform, and not of ti , revolution ; it would
give ' your Majesty time .to .prépare other
changes, to dispose your people to reçoive thom
without surprise- and' without shock,: and
^accustom the r other powers to' them. In a
word,'it is conceived in a spirit "of unity, and
.not in one ,of,, division.-, The Poles deceive
themselves if they think that their wolfare
depends oh a strong line of demarcation being
drawn between the two nations. If they obsti-
nately determine on standing, alone they will
end by being subject and miserable. .
.'- In submitting ,'tô your Majesty the'chief
,considerations which this enormous question
bas presented to my'mihd I feel moro than
ever tho necessity of your Majesty's indul-
gence for the boldness with which I have en-
deavoured to "( fulfil the task which your
Majesty's commands; and my duty have im-
posed upon me. If in my zeal any offensive
expression has 'escaped me, I most humbly
entreat your Majesty's pardon, and: bog you to
believe that ho who only, exists by your
Majesty's bounty fears nothing so'muchas, to
see tho magnanimous intentions of so good
and great a master run the risk of being, de-
ceived by tho': very .feeling of generosity
which has called them into existence.
. I am, ,with respect, Sire, ??
/ Your Majesty's', most humble, most
, obedient, most; devoted, and most
faithful servant and subject,
. t . (Signed) . POZZO DI BOROO.
Vienna, 8th (20 th) October, -1814.
$