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THE ARMSTRONG! GUN AND THE WAH. j
THE De&ofr publishes an article of several columns on
the subject of the Armstrong cannon, explaining its
peoulisr advantage», and the effect whioh' the introduc-
tion of auch tremendous weapons of destruction is likely
. to produce in- actual warfare. Referring to the present
i hostilities, and the employment of rifted cannon in Italy,
: our contemporary makes the following observations t
" The Austrian army, after having made against Pied
monte* an offensive movement, the reason- of whioh is
. still difficult to comprehend, now appears to be prepar-
ing to execute what has been called the plan of General
: Hess-that is to say, to-retire before the allied forces,
and to wait-either before or after a grand battle-io the
strong positions whioh art and nature have prepared for
it on the line of the Minoio. The persons who have
studied the subject are aware that the strength of those
positions principally depends on four larg» fortresses
Brescia, Pesohiera, Verona, and Mantua, whioh in fact,
in 1848, saved the army of Matshol Radetsky. But what
WSB true in 1848-m ay not be so at the present time, and
¡it would probably be a groat mistake to consider those
four fortified places as- so many Sebastopol, likely to
withstand for several months all our -efforts against
them. We had no riflèd, cannon before Sebastopol, and
consequently were compelled in the attaok on that place
to follow the old tradiiions of the artillery and:
! engineers. Rifled connon do not, certainly, authorise
?as to imagine that these fortresses will fall before them
;iike the walls of Jericho before the trumpets of the.
Israelites; bnt their long range allows us to think thoit
in order to ronder those places uutenable-by the enemy,
they afford us means on which we could not have
calculated six months ago. I*et us admit that our guns
will not oarry to the distance of eight kilometres (five
English miles) indicated by Sir W. Armstrong, and their
projectiles-will not reach further than six.kilomotres.that
is oertainly a very modest pretension, and is, we' think,
what will-happen when we shall bs on the line of the
-Minoio, and"before Verona and Mantas, .'Instesd-of
wasting time in making regular approaches, nothing wilt
be more easy. than, tb find, within à range of, from 1000
to 4Ö00 metres from tho place, a' number of positions
either ia woods-or clumps of tress, or farm,- houses, or
garden-'walls, behind whioh a certain-number oT "rifled
cannon might be placed, invisible, and sheltered from
the enemy'a fire, and front which th» shells, diraeted,
not against the ramparts, but against the interior of - the
píaos, would soon render it untenable«. Ten batteries of
artillery, firing twenty Bbots an hpur, -would throw into
the place during a night of only eight-hours 9600-inoeb
diary projectiles which would eause. frightful losses.. It,
would be for the besieging force,,master of; tho-field, a»
Quaotinn cf fiupplj- and ayihing moro ; for even were the
enemy in possession of guns of long range, what advan-
tageous use could they make of them duririg the night,
against an invisible artillery, having the potter of fra"-1
quenfly changing position,"and in small groups almost
impossible to be discovered daring tho day at a distance
of more than a league? It was Marly thia method which
: succeeded-so well at Sweaborg,-where the allias, however,
': had no rifled riannon, and .where twenty steam gunboats
destroyed with their shells one of the largest naval arse- '
nals of Russia, without themselves being touched by one
of the thousands, of shot which were fired at them from
he enemies batteries. Tha mobility of the gunboat
ook tho place of .the advantage, now given-by,the' long
rango. The new artillery has rendered this system
practicable, and it has rstifled the now axiom of tho art
of war, that henceforth fortified places, like towns an the
sea coast, can no longer be usefully proteoted exoopt by
; armies masters of tho country, or. by fleets in the offing.
We havo remarked that in un Austrian bn\Ielin of the
combat of Montebello, tho writer, after having rendered
justioe to- tho excellence of the Frenoh infantry,.deolares
our artillery to ba inferior. We regard .this, declaration
more as a rute de guerre than as a truth. We imagine
;that the objootof it was to tranquillise the Auslrian'arnby
unprovided as it is with long rango guns, as ta tha.effaot
of the new guns, the renown of which has doubtless
reaobed the soldiers of tha Emperor Franois Joseph,
and we leave, it to our artillerymen to prove, to the
enemy that tho renown either of their courage or of, the
power of their weapons.has not been exaggerated." ;
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