Image TileImage TileImage TileImage TileImage TileImage TileImage TileImage TileImage TileImage TileImage TileImage Tile
Image size: 4608x6656 Scale: 35% - PanoJS3
Page overview thumbnail

Article text

GREAT NAVAL TEST FORECAST
jOar Fleets Held Whin Hand
H EA V Y BLOWS
WEAKEN JAPAN
(From Commander Edgar Young, Daily Mirror's Naval
Correspondent )
ONPON, Tuesday. — The terrific blow dealt Japan
at Bali, coming so soon on top of the bad beatings
she took in the Macassar Straits and when a United
States fleet raided the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
must soon force the enemy to seek a test of naval
power.
Dutch leadership and initiative in the Pacific
has_ been magnificent. From now on our naval
attitude should be one of belligerency. We will
suffer losses-— but we can afford them better than
our opponents.
, 1 ,s obvious now — and the task should not be impossible
—that the Allies must keep concentrated at suitable positions
in the Atlantic and Far Eastern theatres battle fleets with all
necessary ancillaries sufficiently strong to face the coming
great test with equanimity.
A NY attempt to appreciate the situ-
ation from a naval viewpoint at
present must obviously be on a
world-wide scale and in close con
nection with the military situation in
. various theatres.
In aggregate naval strength the"
Allies enjoy substantial superiority in
every type of warship except, per-
- haps, armed merchant cruisers, of
which accurate details are unobtain
able, but in which the Japanese are
believed to be particularly strong.
Allied superiority is notable in capi
tal ships, which are still the back
bone of sea-power. This superiority
is less effective than might appear,
owing to our far longer lines of sea
communication and the far greater
volume of shipping we have to protect.
.Against Allied difficulties owing
to the Japanese entry into the war
" is the fact that Japan's overseas ex
pansion has provided her with
growing sea communications and
presented the Allies with new op
portunities for offensive sea action.
Arousing anxiety in certain circles
is the fear that Vichy might hand
over her very important naval forces
to Hitler. Such action would, of
course, very materially, perhaps even
dangerously, reduce the Allies' bal
ance of naval superiority.
FRENCH SHIRS MENACE
The fact that French warships are
stationed at bases of immense strate
gic importance cannot be denied.
Martinique and Dakar are im
portant for the Panama Canal,
Dakar and Casablanca for Cape
routes to Australasia, India, the Per
sian Gulf and Middle East, Casa-
blanca and Oran for Gibraltar, and
| Oran and Bizerta for the Central
Mediterranean and Egypt.
The views of the infamous Darlan,
whose pro-Axis, anti-British outlook
is notorious, are shared by admirals
under him, many now holding impor
tant administrative posts in French
colonies, and also by a fair proportion
of more junior officers.
Probably he is not opposed by any
officers now serving with the Vichy
fleet. Bulk of those holding more en
lightened and progressive views are
either serving with the Free French
naval forces or are on the retired list.
Fortunately for us,' however, the
spirit of petty-officers and ratings is
totally different.
The French Navy has strong Re
publican and strong revolutionary
traditions. This has been kept alive
by numerous Communist elements
of the lower deck and has flamed,
no doubt, into latent militancy since
Hitler launched his Russian attack
and even more since our Soviet ally
achieved such remarkable suc
cesses.
MBBER ATTACKS WANTEMB
We may feel certain, therefore, that
whatever foul plot Petain and Darlan
may hatch in collaboration with the
Germans, it will be flatly rejected in
many instances and actively opposed
by French sailors.
Indeed, it would seem probable
that if we were to modify the tenor
of our French propaganda and make
it resemble the Russjan address, we
would soon find our real friends and
sympathisers in France and French
colonies. The French Fleet might
easily become a valuable reinforce
ment for us and not the enemy.
Let us consider the next probable
sea developments.
First is the tremendous offensive
against our shipping, particularly in
the Atlantic and Indian Oceans,
where we are most vital and vulner
able and where the enemy is using
heavy German ships, Japanese armed
merchant cruisers and submarines.
Axis objects are, firstly, to impede
our war effort in the maintenance of
expeditionary forces and supplies to
Russia , and, secondly, to disperse
our Naval forces so that we can
be mopped up piecemeal, while Axis
warships are used for offensive opera
tions against our territories.
Answer to the first threat will be
the provision of suitably powerful
escorts for all our ships and the ex
tension of the convoy system into
the Indian Ocean and perhaps the;
Pacific, thus producing the disper
sion of our naval forces which the
enemy desires.
Counter measures must be of an
offensive character, so that the initia
tive will be in our hands. They must
be designed to prevent concentration
against us of superior naval forces in
any vital theatre, and we must seek
to dissipate the enemy's naval forces
in a greater measure than he can
dissipate ours.
This might be achieved by the fol
lowing measures: By initiating bold
attacks on Japan's communications
in the Pacific. Japan cannot afford
to lose much merchant shipping, and
the provision of powerful escorts for
her convoys would reduce the number
of units available for offensive action.
In Dutch East Indies by holding
Java and Rangoon and ejecting the
Japanese from Sumatra, Timor and
other places where they have gained
a foothold.
In the Mediterranean we should .
concentrate on air action against the
Italian fleet similar to Taranto, and
initiate amphibious operations against
Sicily and Crete.
We should be prepared to take
steps if necessary in conjunction
with U.S.S.R. to forestall any move
against the Dardanelles and Bos-
pliorus, and to assist in Black Sea
and Baltic offensive operations with
the Red Fleet.
Such operations should have the
effect of putting the enemy on the
defensive in all theatres, though in a
varying degree and forcing him to
seek the inevitable naval decision be
fore he has managed to reduce the .
balance of power against him.
The following tabie illustrates the known strength of world
navies today: —
Brit. U.S. N.E.I. Russia. Germ. Italy. Japan.
Capital Ships .... 15 13 0 4 5 4 7
Aircraft Carriers ... 11 8 0 2 2 0 13
8-in. Cruisers .. .. 17 18 0 4 . 8 3 12
6-in. Cruisers .. . . 53 19 5 7 3 12 22
Destroyers .. .. .. 204 224 16 36 56 123 146
Submarines . ..... 40 113 28 111 71 114 76
TOTALS. — Capital Ships: Allies, 32; Axis, 16. Aircraft Carifers:
Allies, 21; Axis, 15. 8-in. Cruisers: Allies, 31; Axis, 23. 6-in. Cruisers:
Allies, 84; Axis, 37. Destroyers: Allies, 480; Axis, 325. Submarines:
Allies, 292; Axis, 261.
$