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THE PREMIER,
Besides the fearful .losses incurred by mis
management, this inauspicious war has been
attended by an amount of casualties greater
than usual. Misfortune lias thinned our
numbers, and diminished our chances of suc
cess, as much as misconduct. The sacrifice
of so large a portion of our best men by un
equal contests against a foe constantly sup
plied by reinforcements has now been followed
by a loss scarcely less momentous, m the
foundering of the ships, steamers, and trans
ports. This loss is so mnch tlie greater at
this particular conjuncture, when we needed
every vessel that could be spared to strengthen
not only the small body of our gallant couu
trymen who are exposed to the very jaws of
destruction, but to deepen if possible the
impression made by their valour upon their
enemies. If the Russians celebrated Te
Deums for the resistance made by the
garrison at Sebastopol, we shall doubtless
hear of their offering a special thanks
giving to the God of Armies for this exertion of
Sis power in crippling the right hand of their
adversaries. And that fanaticism which could
find occasion upon au inferior cause ? to attribute
a partial success to the special interposition of
I Providence, will not be backward in hugging the
belief that the cause of the Russians is the cause
of God. They will act aud fight accordingly.
It will have been, seen already, by the infor
mation furnished from the French newspapers,
that the Russian clergy have not been .behind
Hand in covering this war with a religious
character, to the best of their ability. ' Without
giving credit to all .the absurd exaggerations of
that account, less willing still to attribute the
courage aud conduct of the Russians to the
inspiration of ardent spirits or , mere fana
ticism^— tho former of which was distinctly
denied by our correspondent at the seat of
war — it may vet be reasonable to conclude'
that religious motives have not been without
their effect. Tho war began in a discussion
about tlie guardianship of the Holy Places ;
the Czar has studiously endeavored to give a
religious aspect to it throughout ; he has rep
resented himself as the guardian of Eastern
Christendom agaiust the Mussulman ; he lias
managed to make . .this appear to the Greek
population throughout the Russian and Turk
ish dominions ; and whatever he or his people
may suffer — -whatever may be their privations,
their hardships, or their 'defeats, tliey will en
dure them all under the belief (and is it; an
uncommon belief in the East ?) that they are
doing- .God service, and suffering in a righteous
cause.
This is to them a tower of strength, wliich
no reverses will remove. It is clear that it is
so, for though matched against the bravest and
most skilled _ armies in the world, though
inefficiently armed and badly officered —
though still smarting under the memory of
Alma — though beaten in every ; previous en
gagement, they did not hesitate to attack
us at Inkerman. Repulsed and repulsed again,
they returned to tlie coriibat with undiniiriislied
resolution they, stood under fire, formed and
reformed' with a coolness and determination
which struck their opponents with admiration,
and made them wonder of what material these
men could bemade, who had fought so differently
at Alma, and to wliat cause their courage could be
attributed. The value of this religious aspect of
the question lias not been lost sight of by the
Czar or Ins omcers ; and we may rely upon.it
that it will not be forgotten now. This last un
toward event will offer a new opportunity for
kindling the religious zeal of his people, and the
Czar will point to our losses by sea as a fresh in
dication that his cause is the cause of the Al
mighty. We expect to hear this event bruited
throughout the Russian dominions ; and if it is
not madei the 1 occasion of another Te Deum
throughout the churches, yet it will bo duly
seized and enlarged upon by those who fully un
derstand and appreciate the spirit of their ruler.
Is the conduct of our Government of a kind
to remove that impression ? Independently of
those unhappy events which have befallen us,
»'.d over which we have no control, would the
Czar need proofs of our infatuation ; or could he
fail of believing that we aro demented in the
self-security with which we have carried on the
war, as if instantaneous success were certain,
and we could at any time command it ; in tlie
consequent neglect of necessary precautions ;
and, '? above all, in our leaving the conduct of it
to a set of men all of whom are, for one reason
or other, opposed to this war, aud still more op
posed to it as a war with Russia. To attack
Sebastopol, in tlie first instance, with insufficient
forces, or even to attack it at all ; then to send
no sufficient reinforcements for carrying on the
siege vigorously or completely ; to undo with
one hand what was done with the other; to
leave the north open, by which escape was pos
sible and fresh troops and provisions could be
poured in at any time ; to overlook Odessa,
Perekop, and Simpheropol, the great trunk
arteries for supplying fresh blood to the
besiegers: — these and similar incidents will
furnish indications to the , Czar , of that
judicial blindness which lie Will inter
pret into a Divine one. And though the peo
ple, in their parochial gatherings, may sub
scribe to the Patriotic Fund, or in their resorts
of business may expel with ignominy and
strong marks of resentment all who are found
favouring the Russian cause, will the Czar
think that they arc in earnest, when he sees
at the head of the nation, directing all its
counsels, a man who makes no secret, of his
preference for Russia, aud whose private at
tachments, as well as liis avowed public
opinions, aro inimical to Turkey ? Without
meaning any reproach to Lord Aberdeen, we
believe it is impossible for him to act heartily in
any war against Russia. It is true that he docs
not profess to do so. It is true that he makes
no concealment of his opinions and prejudices
on that head, and, therefore, if the nation
continues him in office, they do it with their
eyes open. They are more to blame than he.
But were he to be at the pains of making the
most opposite professions to those which Lord
Aberdeen is in tlie habit of making, it would
be impossible to accept them. Lord Aber
deen belongs to that school of politicians
whose hereditary creed, is diametrically opposed
to any war with Russia, for amy cause. The
old political traditions of the Whigs,
which, with all their changes, vacillations,
and political combinations, the Whigs can
never abandon and remain Whigs still, are not
more inseparable from them thau are the par
ticular tenets which guide the foreign policy of
Lord Aberdeen and his school of statesmen.
Those tenets, 'it is true, are become antiquated
— the circumstances and position of affairs to
which they once applied have changed —
changed, indeed, marvellously so far as Russia
is concerned during the last few years ; but
what then? Do men abandon their creed
under such changes— still more men of Lord
Aberdeen's temper, age, and experience? We
say, and say it boldly, that Lord Aberdeen
must do violence to ' all his convictions, to
tlie principles upon which he has been edu
cated, to all the maxims which have governed
his political conduct, if he is to be found
acting heartily against the greatest of the
northern powers. If we are to have such
a war, aud all our previous political relations
to be thus radically changed, Lord Aberdeen
is not the man to conduct it— even were the
natural coldness aud reluctance of the man
to such a war not augmented, by his age,
but owing exclusively to his political creed
and convictions. — London Homing Herald.
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