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PACIFIC BASES.
AUSTRALIA'S MANDATE.
CLAIM FOR RETENTION.
U.S. CONTROL OPPOSED.
All service personnel, particu
larly those who have fought in
the ocean areas, will be pro
foundly disturbed at the sugges
tion that the control of Maenus
Harbour, in the Admiralty Is
lands, should pass from Australia
to the United States of America.
At the conclusion of the 1914-18
war, a farseeing Australian Gov
ernment, realising the importance
of this area to the defence of Aus
tralia, insisted on, and secured,
the allocation of the mandate for
these islands under the League of
Nations. The suggestion has now
been put forward that the control
of the area should pass to Ame
rica. While the reasons for this
have not been adequately outlined,
the general suggestion is that
America should secure permanent
control of this area because of the
American blood and treasure
sacrificed in the Pacific.
It is impossible to admit this as
a proper reason for securing control
of selected areas by any one of the
United Nations. If it is admitted,
then surely Britain should claim
control of the whole of Egypt. Aus
tralia could put in a forcible claim
for a considerable part of Syria and
for Dutch portions of Borneo.
Prom the point of view of America,
such claim is not four-square `with
President Roosevelt's assertion that
America sought no territorial con
trols. Surely, too, the quality of
sacrifice cannot be put in terms
of localities or even by the enormity
of effort. It would be Impossible to
claim that the sacrifices of America
were equal to the sacrifices of
Britain. While the British people
have lived throughout the whole
war under conditions not far short
of starvation, America has been a
land of plenty. In Australia the
whole national effort has been out
forward for the whole period of the
war, and the financial burden of the
war has brought us from one of the
lightly taxed peoples to one of the
heaviest in the world.
Surely our claims in the Pacific
area are as great as any to a Pacific
locality vital to us and allotted to
us under mandate after the last
war.
Moreover, It is impossible to accept
a claim that Manus has much
strategical value in the defence of
the United States. This idea has
grown out of the fact that the only
American line of advance for the
recapture of the Philippines was
along this route. This. of course,
was due mainly to the fact that the
rapid Japanese advance had enabled
them to seize the whole of the chain
of islands as far south as Guadal
canal, forcing Allied strategy to fol
low up this line of islands in order
to establish bases for successive ad
vances. Thus Manus became a most
important base for the recapture of
the Philippines. When these were
recaptured it became a second-line
base, and the Philippines became the
important base for further attacks
on Japan. It is hardly to be ex
pected that the Japanese will again
get such an opportunity of over
running our outpost positions as
rapidly and easily as they did in
1942.
Strategic Value.
Casual consideration is apt to dis
regard distances in evaluating the
strategic value of specific localities.
A brief study of the map of the
Pacific will show the geographical
relationship of the United States to
all potential enemy areas in Asia.
This will show that Manus is far
ther from the western coast of
America than is Japan. Some 5.000
miles of sea lies between Manus and
the America coast. Tokio is actu
ally 1,000 miles nearer San Fran
cisco than is Manus. Both Toklo
and San Francisco are approximately
35deg. north of the Equator. giving
them the same latitude. A line
drawn from Manus north to where
it intercepts the route from San
Francisco to Tokio gives a distance
of some 2,500 miles. It is impos
sible to claim, in view of their rela
tive positions, that the possession of
Manus can have any real strategical
value for America in relation to no
tential enemies in Asia.
'What, then. can be its strategical
value to the United States? The fact
of the matter is that Manus is stra
tegically important to Australia and
New Zealand only among the
United Nations.
A movement from Asia against
Australia must inevitably show its
direction when it passes New
Guinea. In the recent war the
movement was against the eastern
coast of Australia. A movement
against the western coast must
inevitably pass somewhere west of
New Guinea and between it and
Singapore. Singapore in luxtaoosi
tion to Manus is, therefore, of the
greatest importance viewed from this
angle,.and no one will claim that it
should be in any other hands than
those of the British Emoire.
In the years to come Manus will
flfil an equally important role in
relation to the safety of the east
coast of Australia, and ise states.
manship must ensure that it remains
under Australian or, at any rate,
British Empire controL
Future Relations With U.S.A.
Our relations with America are
happily of the best, and I yield to
none in the warmth of my feeling
for that great people and country.
But what grounds have we to as
ume the continuance of these happy
relations over the generations to
come? Less than 50 years ago we
werE actively supporting the Jap
anese in their Asiatic campaigns.
Who can say what forces and influ
nes il arise in America and in
Australia in the long years ahead of
us to disturb the existing relations?
All history shows that there Is no
permanent stability in the field of
international relationshlis. and
while one believes that the very
existence of civillsation will depend
on stabllising these relations. who
can foresee the trends of thought
of the future? Who could have fore
cast the rise of Hitler or of Mus
solini or even of Almee McPherson
50 years ago?
We are striving to look into the
future of the development of atomic
energy. But it is wise to examine
whether we are not blind to the
future development of psychological
energy among nations. It is the
development of trends of human
thought more than any other factor
that brings us to war.
Avoid Past Mistakes.
The future of those Japanese areas
which have been seized by the United
States during the war we are con
tent to leave to the United States
of America! The Japanese mandated
areas, although well southward from
the United States themselves,
directly cover the Philipoines
Islands. And although America
may occupy these they are still far
away from Australia. Nor could we
see the way to raise any objection
to American retention of them if
own safety.
It is not many years since the
British handed over control of the
British naval bases in Southern Ire
land to the Irish. The cost of that
gesture in British lives and shioping
during the war just ended has not
yet been measured. Is a similar
lack of foresight on our part to Ihave
a similar result for Australian cene
ratians yet unbor-n?
We would be blind to the teachine
f? all history if we allow any nation.
however friendly its disposition to
w'ards us may be at the moment,
to ,occupy a base in an area vital to
our safety, and to which we alobe
can lay a Just and proper claim.
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