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AIR STRENGTH
yaàh m in INDIAN OCEAN.
OM ltetaitaflt in vain for *> ray of
hat» in ta« Indian Ocean situation. We
«ann u< ba bUnd to trw fact that matters
ar« jago"* l writeajhe Sunday Mail's"
That th« Japan««« have been able' to
.and a powerful neat into thoa« etas,
with -«m«!»^«»»« stretching w^wy
thousands of miles back to th« main naval
bases, ia an md ¡ostión of the paucity of
our naval and air strength in the lästern
theatre of war» '
It ia against an the rules ot naval war
fare to risk heavy «hipe at such great
diatancea from bases with docking facili-
ties fm* this das* of ship, unless -there is
a certainty that they will not meet equally
heavy, or heavier, sates during their
The Japanese must be fortified with the
knowledge that no such danger exists to
have risked such a move.
It will be remembered that Britain sent
two ships of the dreadnought class thou-
sand« of miles toto th« Southern Atlantic
to hunt von Spec in 1914.
The Admiralty was able to do this with
the confident knowledge that von Spee's
naval squadron was inferior in both speed
and armament to the two British ships.
So the question ot risk was not involved
Is th« Japanese move a parallel case ?
There is a further disturbing factor,
and that ia the' ability ot th« Japanese
to detach a fleet from home waters with
the constant threat of United States naval
operations against the sea communications
between Japan and the South-Western
Pacific.
After au, the United States fleet is a
power to be reckoned with. That the
Japanese have dared to do this thing sug-
gests that they are confident of being
able to fight in two seas at the same
time ?«»suming that Brush naval forces
are not entirely concentrated in home
waters and the Mediterranean.
The Ices of the Hermes and two
cruisers by dive-bombing attack« ii diffi-
cult to .understand. One would .have
wought that the linking ot the Prince
of Wales and the Repulse would have
provided its own tesson.
But lt ii a strange thing how fixed
Idew, even in the Navy, become rooted
in the official mind.
It ii only a year ago since Slr Herbert
Russell, a noted naval critic wrote that
the "time for any such devastation from
the air has definitely paned."
He wa« referring to the circulation ot
alarming pictures ot the precarious posi-
tion of the British fleet at Alexandria
tn relation to Italy's air armada.
He went on to say. "Nobody will deny
that a capital ship is a big mark for
an enemy bomber. But when-such .capi-
tal ships c?n greet the bomber with
something Uk« 'three dozen high-angle
weapons one feels for the aircraft much
as George Stephenson «aid he felt for the
cow when asked what would happen if
lt got in the way ot hil locomotivo."
Since Japan came into the war. some
of the heaviest 3hlps ifloat have been
sunk in Pearl Harbour, and off the coast
of Malaya by aircraft bombing alane, in
the face of anti-aircraft fire.
When are we going to hear the end
ot this ever lecvrring explanation that
such and such a thing happened be-
cause of the lack of air support?
There is one bright spot in tile news,
and that ls the statement by tiieut.
General Brett, Chief of the Allied Air
Forces in the South-west Pacific, that the
air offensive against the Japanese is go-
ing to be intensified, and that the Allies
are "out to smash the Japanese In the
.ir."
There ls one unfortunate qualification,
however, and that is his statement that
"our only limitation li equipment."
Th« tact ii that it the equipment side
of the ledger ii not rapidly improved,
and we know everything possible is be-
ing done, the situation might easily get
out of hand
It is only a combined air and naval
offensive from the direction of the south-
western Pacific, that will relieve the
dangerous situation in the Indian Ocean,
and . that must take place soon.
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