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AIR COVER
LACKING
Setbacks In
Tunisia
"The Age'' Special Correspondent
LONDON, December 7.
The Allied setback in Tunisia
must not be seen out of focus.
The British commander, Lleuten-
ant-General Anderson, for the
sake of speed, took a gamble and
pushed out a "fist" by sending
limited numbers of advanced ele
ments forward without much air
cover.
If this had come off, the whole
North African operation would
have been shortened, but the
German commander, General
Nehring, quickly seizing his
chance to bruise the fist, threw In
tanks and all the aircraft he
could muster. As a result, Neh
ring recaptured Djedeirdacoq, and
held It throughout the week end,
despite Anglo-American counter
attacks: while at Teburba he al
most encircled the Allied forces,
who escaped from the enemy pin
cers by withdrawing.
The reverse Is by no means a
desperate one for the Allies, but
It will result in a delay of at
least a week or two.
The reasons for the setback are
both strategical and tactical. The
Axis has the advantage of shorter
suppiy lines, and was thus able
to build up quickly a small strik
ing force of high quality, and
also to maintain air superiority.
The fine quality of the enemy
troops compensate for their rela
tively small number. They con
sist of picked veteran troops,
trained for quick raids and stub
born defence.
Allied Mistake
The opinion is now expressed
that it would have been wiser to
attach to the Allied staffs in North
Africa experienced officers from
the Eighth Army and the Middle
East Air Command, whose wide
tactical experience might have
prevented the mistakes which the
Allies have undoubtedly made In
Tunisia.
One of the most serious errors
appears to have been taking the
chance of making an advance
without ensuring sufficient air
protection. Evidence is mounting
that incessant concentrated .dive-
bombing was one of the primary
causes of the Allies' enforced
withdrawal. It has been proved
that dive-bombers are ineffective
when fighters are numerous, and
free enough to oppose them. It is
unthinkable that fighter protec
tion . was not among the Allies'
plans, and it is now clear that the
advanced air fields needed for
such an "umbrella" could not be
prepared in time.
The available air fields are
mostly too far from the'land' bat
tle area for effective cover by
short-range flghtersf-the 'only
sort of cover which would have
been effective. They . are some
way from the ports, are served by
bad roads, and in poor condition.
In addition, it is presumed that
they have been strafed by the
Luftwaffe.
Well-informed opinion here Is
that it will be only a matter of
time before the balance of air
power changes in favor of the-
Allies. A sharp increase In our
fighter attacks can be" expected as
the advanced air fields are .. im
proved. .
The tip of Tunisia can be con
quered, held and exploited only by
superior air power. That is the
tactical lesson, which the Allied
commanders must have learnt by
now. The enemy has realised It
throughout, hence the desperate
effort he has thus far -made to
retain it.
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