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MEN and
AFFAIRS
Retreats from Moscow
1812-1942
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>w jO ST students
;|K jm of history have
read oft h e
I d isast rous
M Mo s c o w
campaign of
Napoleon in
1812. To-day there are hopes
that the . proverbial historical
repetition will again work out
to our advantage.
'The merest glnnce at the ' record
of the earlier- invasion is sufficient
to show how close a resemblance
there is between the two military ad
ventures.. The standard "Life of
Napoleon," by J. H. Rose, summa
rises the more important features,
>nnd points to many striking parallels.
'.In 1812 Napoleon and the ' Em
peror Alexander had been linked for
some time by a treaty, but' their re
lations were becoming somewhat
strained. Even at the close of 1808
Alexander had confessed his 'own
, feelings with regard to his ally.
"Napoleon," he said, "was a man
who would not scruple to use any
means as long as he .gained .his
own end.'. . . His fits of passion were
only meant to .-intimidate; his every
act was the result of calculation." The
impression left on the confidant was
that Alexander understood his ally
thoroughly and feared him greatly.
A Former "New Order"
Various misunderstandings had
'arisen, and in 1810 Napoleon writes
"that the Russians are entrenching
themselves on the Dwlna and Dnies
ter, which "shews a bad spirit." The
main trouble arose through Na
poleon's continual effort to control
'the whole trade of Europe in an
early form of "new order," and.it
was due to the Czar's refusal to co
operate with him .that the breach
occurred between the two monarchs.
"Napoleon saw that . Alexander was
.slipping out of the leading strings
of. the Treaty of Tilsit . . . which
was intended to confirm the supre
macy of the Western Empire. To
both potentates it had been, at bot
tom. nothing more than a , truce.
Napoleon saw in it a means of sub-
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;mcrclal code, and of preparing for
a Franco-Russian partition of Tur-
.key. The Czar hailed it as a breath-
" tog space whereto he could reorga
nise his army, conquer Finland and
stride towards the Balkans. By the
close of 1811 both potentates had
.exhausted all the benefits likely to
accrue from their alliance ... Na
poleon flattered himself that the con
quest of Spain was well-nigh assured,
v and that England was in her last
agonies. On the other hand, Rus
sia had - recovered her military
strength, had galnied Finland and
Elan ted her foot on the . lower
lanube." Napoleon therefore pre
pared for a surprise campaign
against Russia, in which the whole
of the Continent was to be mobilised
against his quondam ally. One
"country that did not prove wholly
co-operative was Prussia, but even
tually she was brought into line, and
.agreed to send 20,000 troops besides
help with food and forage. Sweden,
however, proved obdurate, and even
tually sided with Russia.
" Before the final die was cast Rus
sia put forward certain reasonable
proposals for 'peace, which were re
fused by Napoleon, who at once
"sought to overawe his Eastern rival
by a display of imposing force." Lord
"Qt a dominion that far excelled that
of the Czar in material resources,
suzerain of1 seven kingdoms and
thirty principalities, he called his
allies and vassals about him at Dres
den, and gave to the world the last
vision of that imperial splendor which
'dazzled. the imagination of men.
' Russian Toughness
The Czar, however, resolved to trust
to the toughness of his people and
-the defensive strength of his bound-
"less plains. The hosts of Napoleon
-were thereupon mustered, 200,000
-jFrench. being the kernel. They ln-
;i: -eluded 147,000 Germans, while 80,000
' i Italians formed an "army of observa-
tion." There' were also Poles, Illyrl-
ans, Swiss and Dutch, who. with
Spaniards and Portuguese, swelled the
grand army to 600,000 men. Nor was
this all. Austria and Prussia sent
50,000 men to guard Napoleon's
flanks.
Russia's original plan of facing the
enemy behind fortifications in a
pitched battle was changed to one of
retirement and "scorched earth," as
i it is now known. On June 23 three
immense French columns marched
over the pontoon bridges hastily
I thrown over the Niemen. near Kovno.
I No Russian was seen, and "for three
j: days the Grand Army filed over the
' river and melted away into the Sandy
i wastes. No foe at first contended
! their march, but neither were they
! met by the crowd of down-trodden
natives whom their fancy pictured as
thronging to welcome their liberators.
In truth solitude, the sultry heat of
a Russian midsummer and drenching
thunder storms depressed the spirits
of the invaders. . . . The difiiculties
, of the transport service began at once,
and they were to increase with, every
day's march."
Napoleon had, as always, made
great provision for the needs of his
i men, Including the supply of two mil-
' ' lion pairs of boots and other stores
i in proportion, having made Danzig
I _ the principal base of supply. But a
great part of these stores never
readied the troops owing to the activi-
' ties of British cruisers in the Baltic
and the enormous wastage of horse-
I flesh to the carriage of stores from
I the Niemen. The men were thus
! largely left to marauding for their
supplies of food. The Lithuanians —
I at first sympathetic with the French
— soon lost their enthusiasm when
1 called upon to find food for Napoleon's
hordes.
After several engagements, includ-
2 tog the bloody fight at Smolensk,
which had an indecisive result, . the
Russian army was still undefeated.
Then the momentous question faced
Napoleon whether he should halt now
that summer was on the wane, or
snatch under the walls of Moscow
the triumph which Vilna, Vitepsk and
Smolensk had promised and denied.
It is stated by that melodramatic
narrator Count Philip Segur that on
entering Vitepsk the Emperor ex
claimed, "The campaign of 1812. is
ended; that of 1813 will do the rest."
His marshals were of a like opinion.
One or two minor skirmishes resulted
1 in his favor, and. according to one
; wrstcr, he said. "I must finish the
I War by the end of September. X am
going .to Moscow. One or two battles
will settle the 'business. I will burn
Tula, and Russia will be at my
feet."
At Borodino Napoleon prepared to
finish the war at a blow. A great
battle was fought, in which the Rus-
. sians were defeated,' . losing about
40,000 men, while the cost to the vic
tors was probably as great. After this
fight the Grand Army tolled on
through the heat, dust and smoke of
burning villages towards Moscow,
which they entered on' September 14.
The story of Napoleon's stay In that
capital is well known. The city was
set on fire stores were burned or had
been removed, and Napoleon himself
barely escaped from the fire with his
life. Shelter of a sort was obtainable
for the army, but the food problem
quickly became acute, the Russians
having destroyed .practically every
thing.
Dogma of Infallibility
Soon after the great fire "Napoleon
sent secret and alluring overtures to
Alexander for an armistice, which
were rejected, and the Czar clung to
his vow never to treat With his rival
as long as a. single French soldier
stood on Russian soil." "Slowly the
truth begins to dawn on Napoleon
that by gaining Moscow he had really
gained nothing, and that his march
to the old capital was little more than
a sword flash through a pond." Had
he set himself to study with his
former care the real nature of the
hostile organism he would certainly
never have ventured past Smolensk.
But he had now merged the thinker
to the conqueror, and— sure sign, of
coming disaster — his mind no longer
accurately gauged facts, it recast them
to Its own mould. By long manipula
tion of, men and events, it had' framed
a dogma of personal infallibility.
At last the time came when retreat
became imperative, and Napoleon de
cided to go into winter quarters be
tween the Dnieper and Dwina. He
intended to retire by a more southerly
route, which had hot been denuded
by war. On October 19, therefore, he
set out with 115,000 men, hoping to
reach Lithuania before the severe
cold set in. South of Malo-Jarosla-
vitz, however. Russians were strongly
posted, and he decided to turn about
and retire over his devastated line of
advance. A soldier who survived the
march wrote:—
"Everywhere we saw waggons aban-
doned for want of horses to draw
lliein. Those who bore along with
them the spoils of Moscow trembled
for their riches, but we were dis
quieted most of all at seeing the de
plorable state of our cavalry. The vil
lages which had but lately given us
shelter were level with the ground,
under their ashes were the bodies of
hundreds of soldiers and peasants."
Early in November the Russian
Cossacks began to attack, and at
Viasma only bad judgment 'on the
of the Russian commander saved
the hungry hordes of retreating
French. "Up to November 6 the wea
ther had been mild and open, but
then the first storm of winter fell on
the straggling array and completed its
miseries. To reach Smolensk was now
the dearest thought of every heart,
but on arrival there the wreck of the
city provided but poor shelter, stores
were exhausted and men swarmed -out
of the fancied abode - of plenty and
pounced on every horse that stumbled
on the ice."
Not Fine to Look Upon
Then came the disaster of the River
Beresina, across which a small frag
ment of the army eventually struggled
after a day and night of horror, dur
ing which thousands were Broomed in
the icy stream. At Smorgonl, on De
cember 5, Napoleon told his marshals
that he was leaving them to raise
300,000 men, and his great care was
to prevent the extent of the disaster
becoming speedily known. He wrote to
Marat; "Remove all strangers from
Vitoa, the army is not fine to look
upon just now," The stores were
soon plundered and as' the Cossacks
drew near the remnant of the army
decamped in. pitiable panic. "Amidst
ever deepening misery they struggled
on, until, of the 600,000 men who had
proudly crossed the Niemen for the
conquest of Russia, only 20,000 fam
ished, frost-bitten, unarmed spectres
staggered across the bridge of Kovno
in the middle of December."
In an endeavor of exculpate Na
poleon, many French historians say
the losses were due to an extremely
severe and early winter. This excuse
seems familiar to our ears to-day. In
actual fact, in Napoleon's case, the
main damage to the army had- been
done before the severe cold set to. In
cidentally, It is stated that the French
soldiers stood the cold better than the
North Germans, and this fact may
have some bearing on present events.
Thus ended the campaign of 1812,
which broke once for all the legend of
a vaunted invincibility, and paved the
way for a final , defeat at Waterloo In
1815.
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