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EUSSIA AND CHINA.
times, 28th may.1
At the present time, when it is possible
fliat the news may arrive at any moment of
<omo occurrence rendering the outbreak of hos
tilities between Russia and Chjna inevitable,
It will bo appropriate to describe and to con-
sider tho relations which have subsisted be
tween their two Governments in the past; and
this is the more necessary as their rcspcctivo i
statesmen have to t&ke into consideration !
ether circumstances as well as those con
nected with tho province of Kuldja, the point
Immediately in dispute. The relations be
tween Russia and China represent as complex
a subject as might be expected .when it is
stated that they have a common frontier for
tnore than 4000 miles. Three hundred years
ago, the rulers of Pekrn and of Moscow
were still far distant from each other, and
the only link between them was the
remembrance of tho Mongol conquests.
But within the next hundred years the Rus
sian conquest of Siberia, and the gradual ex
tension of tho Chinese dominions under the
Manchus, brought the troops of the two
empires into contact on the Amour. Keen
Lung's triumphs in Central Asia a century
later only affected the connection indirectly,
und perhaps imperceptibly ; but this retro-
Bpect, while taking us through some little
known chapters of history, will make the
whole of the past sufficiently clear. Tho con
quest of Siberia, which the Cossack Irm&k
had begun in tho sixteenth century, was com
plected before the year 1650 by the annexation
of the country lying to the north of the
Amour, and by tho subjection of tho more
important Tungusian tribes. Almost simul
taneously with tho establishment of tho
present dynasty upon the throne of .
Pekin, Russia, therefore, became directly
interested in the condition of tbo northern de
pendencies of China, and of the great high
road through Kiachta and Kalgan to tho capi
tal. A chain of forts, of which Albazin and
Kamarskiidftstrog — or Bimply Astrog — were the
principal, was constructed along »the new fron
tier, and steps were taken, not only to defend
what had been won, but also to turn the new
possessions to the best account for the advance
ment of commerce. At first the Manchus
were cither indifferent to the movements of
Russia— although a Russian Envoy had
visited Pekin as early as 1656 — or too much
occupied in establishing their position in China
to assqrt their rights on the Amour, and it
may be doubted whether they would have
directed their attention as soon as they did to
this quarter if the successes of the Juugarian
prince Galdan had not supplied a .stronger
incentive than the activity of a small
body of Russian traders and adventurers.
Be that as it may, however, it was not
until the year 1GS0, when the Emperor
Kanghi had been twenty ycara upon the
throne, that events in this quarter reached a
crisis. A large Chinese army had marched
beyond the Great Wail inconsequence of the.
war with Galdan, and Kanghi's power had |
been rendered incontestable among the Khal-
kas by its victories on the Kcrulon. Doubt
less it. seemed an intolerable insult to the
successful ruler that there should bo in his j
close neighbqrhood a people who were iude- |
pendent, if not absolutely hostile to him. The |
army on the spot supplied a ready means for \
carrying out his wishes, and a detachment was 1
accordingly sent to attack the fort nt Astrog. i
The garrison held out bravely, and the I
Chinese were forced to retreat with some !
loss. They soon returned, however, in greater
strength, and, disregarding the smaller fort
at Astrog, laid siege to Albazin, the principal
Btronghold of the Russians. The garrison was
obliged to Buirender, and was sent to Pekin,
whero it became the nucleus of a Russian
colony, and the fort was razed to the ground.
Discouraged by this disaster, the troopa in tbe
other forts evacuated their positions aud with
drew. The Chinese army was shortly after- ,
wards summoned away by the outbreak of a ;
fresh war with Galdan ; and within a 'year
after these reverses ;the Russians returned and
rebuilt their fort at Albazin. The local
Chinese forces again attacked it, hut their
efforts produced little or no result. Reinforce
ments were sent from Pelcin, but K&nghi,
much occupied with graver matters elsewhere,
wanted peace, and sent at the same time two
missionaries, one of whom was Father Ger-
billon, to negotiate a truce with the Russians.
A treaty was concluded and signed on the 7tli
of September, 1689, by tho terms of which
several Russian forts were destroyed and
their territory restricted to the northern
side of the Ergon, a tributary of the |
Amour. " Perpetual peace between tlie two ,
Empires " was also declared, aud, although the
peace is not likely to prove " perpetual," this
treaty of Nipch'u still deserves to be considered
most successful in its aims. It was, in par
ticular, a triumph for Chinese diplomacy, as
it secured all the ends that could have been se
cured by war.
In 1692 Peter the Great sent an envoy to
Pekin for the purpose of acquiring more cor
rect information about the Chinese Empire ;
but nothing is known of the fortunes of this
mission beyond the brief report that the " Em
peror Kanghi gave it a very flattering recep
tion." Tho Chinese continued to carry j
on their systematic policy of opposing
by every means in their power the commence
ment of a land trade with Russia, The j
Mongols were incited to encroach boyond the
frontier, and, early in the last century, Albazin
was again taken, and its garrison sent to
Peldn to join the prisoners previously
settled there. These flagrant breaches of
tho treaty of Nipchu excited less indigna
tion in the mind of the Russian Government,
because the scene was so remote from their
view, but they bo far operated on Peter that
he determined to send a fresh mission to |
Pekin. M. Ismaloff was appointed ambassa
dor, and M. de Lange, the historian of tho ;
mission, Ills secretary. This was the most ,
graciously received of all the Russian ombas- j
nies. Ismaloff made a cTy favorable impres- ,
eion upon the aged Kanghi, and when he left
Do Lange was permitted to remain as th© re
presentative of the Russian Government. Tho
Chinese Ministers soon showed by their acts
that they did not approve the affability of the
Emperor. De Lango was unable to procure
any concessions in matters of trade, and to all
bis complaints the Chincso officials made tbe
uniform reply that "trade was a matter
of little consequence, and regarded by tliem
with contempt." The natural shrewdness
of the ' people showed itself in the
assertion that " these merchants come here to
enrich themselves, not our people." De Lange
was glad enough to withdraw in the company
of the only caravan that arrived from Russian
territory, and in his last interview he received ;
what may be called tho ultimatum of the Pekin 1
Cabinet on the question of the relations with i
Russia, which was to the effect that " no
transactions should bo carried on between tho
two nations except upon the frontiers." The
deaths of the two Emperors Peter aud Kanghi
occurring shortly after the withdrawal of M.
do Lange, a favorable opportunity was afforded
for reverting to tbe amicable consideration of
the question, wliich hod again assumed an un
satisfactory aspect in consequence of events on
the Mongol frontier, und tlie sudden departure
of the Czar's representative from Pekin, with
out having recourse to the extreme measures
for which Russia was then ill-prepared.
Kanghi's successor, Yung Ching, was a mau
of peace ; and in 172S a second treaty was
concluded at Kiachta. In many respects this
new arrangement only ratified those already iu
force, but the mere ratification was a point
gained by tho Russians. There were other
concessions, of which that included in the fifth
article was not the least noteworthy. By this
clause in the treaty, which was the handiwork
of Count Vlftdislavitch, Russia obtained the
right to build a church and to have a small
mission consisting of ten persons at Pekin.
The Chinese Government pays most of the ex
penses connected with this establishment, and
the Russians sent periodically from Siberia
learn the Manchu and Chinese languages
under the easiest and most favorable condi
tions. Nominally, all the members of this re
sident mission should be changed every ten
years ; but, as a matter of fact, they generally
remain a considerably longer period. The
treaty of Kiachta was not less remarkable for
defining the regulations which were to guide the
caravan trade, and the rule was laiddo wn that a
caravan of not more than 200 persons might
proceed every three years to the capital. The
trade which is carried on under the provisions
of tbis treaty has now become very extensive,
although it remains hampered by the fact that
the transactions are those of barter and not
purchase. Ihe effect produced by the provi-
rions of the Kiachta treaty on the mind of the'
Chinese can be best judged by their sending a
return embassy to St. Petersburg. Until quite
recently this was the only embassy the Chinese
Government had ever sent abroad ; and, of
course, mandarins of only tbe second order wero
topatchcd to represent the Bogdo Khan at the
court of the Emperorof the Oros. They reached
St Petersburg in the year 1733, and returned
laden with presents. The Chinese had even
then by no means come to tho conclusion that
It was desirable that trado with Russia should
be foctored. Thoy continued to throw im-
padfcipenfe in the way of tho Russian merchants,
ipjjo at last began to be indifferent to
tbe subject when they found that they often
bud te dispose of their goods at half the price
thef Intended As a consequence of this dis-
A th& same time of
the caravan was only sent'every six ycara in
the interval between 1733 and 1762 ; and then
the Empress Catherine II. abolished the cara
van trade altogether, making commercial rela
tions with China through Kiachta free to all
Russian subjects. The relations between the
two Governments continued to he of an unsa
tisfactory character, while the coaqucsts of the
Emperor Keen Lung in Eastern Turkestan
made it more than over necessary that there
should be a friendly understanding between
them. The tono which the Chincso adopted
towards the Russians was, as an official docu
ment expressed it, that of an " elder
brother but the question was gra
dually finding a simpler solution. The trade
with Pekin, which to bo successful
required tbe approval of the Chincso
Government, was steadily declining, but
in its place, securing all the practical objects
of the larger undertaking, a very considerable
land traffic was springing up at Kiachta and
M&im&chin, and has gone on increasing year
by year. In 1809 a Russian envoy, Coimt
Goloiken was turned back at the Great Wall
and refused permission to proceed to Pekin be-
caused he declined to perform the " prostra
tion ceremony." The Go-lo-ssc, as the Chi
nese call the Russians, then attempted to es
tablish trade relations with China by sea, but
in this they met with little success, and no
. encouragement to persevere. The Govern
ment categorically refused to allow Russia to
trade with their subjects otherwise than
through Kiachta. Eleven years afterwards
another mission, of which M. Timkowski had
the charge, was sent to Pekin to bring back
the mission despatched in 1809, and M. Tim
kowski has left us a very interesting descrip
tion of Pekin and the Chinese as they ap
peared to him. The same kind of
diplomatic intercourse continued until tho
time of the war with the European
powers in 1S59 ; and tlio only event of any
importance in the interval was the treaty of
Kuldja, Bigncd in 1851, for the regulation of
the trade in Eastern Turkestan. In l8:»9-60,
Russia's astute representative at Pekin, Gene
ral Ignatieff, figured as the sympathiser aud
well-wisher of the Chinese ; but he did not
scruple to avail himself of tbe prostration that
beset the Pekin court after the triumph of tho
allies by dcroauding the surrender to Russia of
the maritime province of Manchuria, the value
of which had been discovered at the time of
the Crimean war. The Chinese wero unable
to refuse compliance with this demand, and
the Russian frontier was accordingly advanced
to the close vicinity of Corea and the import
ant city of Moukdcn. Of all tho powers,
Russia, the reputed friend of the Chinese, pro
bably gained tho most by the war of 1860 ;
but it only required a return of confidence to
reveal to the Chinese Ministers the one-sided-
ness of Russia's sympathy. Notwithstanding
this, there was still ostensibly tbe closest
friendship between the two states ; and when,
in 1871, Russia stepped in and put down the
independent ruler Abul Oghlan in the lost
Chinese province of Kuldja, this was supposed
to have dictated the pledge given at Pelcin
that the occupation of Kuldja was only tem
porary, and that as soon as a Chinese army of
sufficient strength to maintain order was sent
it should bo restored. It was not until two
years ago, when the Chinese army had reco
vered all the other lost provinces, that they dis
covered that the Russians would not prove as
good as their word. On that point it is un
necessary to say anything here ; hut from this
retrospect it may be apparent that the ques
tion between Russia and China is a much
larger one than the mere Kuldja difficulty.
That is only one, if the most pressing,
phase of the problem how the relations of
two great and warlike countries are to lie
conducted when tlicy have a common frontier
for thousands of miles, and when that frontier
is not only in many places vague, but a perma
nent testimony to the triumphs of one State
over the other. The Chinese not unnaturally
resent the actual condition of their borders for
that reason as well as for others. They see iu
the large garrison in Russian Manchuria a
menace to their capital and their northern me
tropolis — Moukdcn — as well as a hidden
danger with regard to Corea ; nQr are they
better satisfied with tbe present state of tilings
further west in Mongolia and Kobdo. The
Kuldja difficulty has revived all these kindred
matter; but it does not appear that its solu
tion in favorof China would alone suffice to
finally dispose of the complication that has
arisen between tlie two Governments. The
suspicions of China are fully aroused, aud she
seems to bo quite determined not to rest until
she is satisfied that she has little or nothing to
fear on her northern and western frontier.
The Russian Government seems to be
making every preparation in view of the pos
sibility of a rupture with China. Very large
orders for various kinds of war material have
been given to all the Government contractors,
especially by tlie Artillery department, and
great activity prevails at Croii3tadt and at
other ports iu getting ready the second squa
dron of vessels destined for the coast of
Eastern Siberia. Tho manufacture of torpe
does to be despatched to Yladivostock on
vessels of tho volunteer fleet is also being
much accelerated. A special council of war
was held here last week, at which General
Todleben was present, and it is believed that
the question of how to meet the Chinese in
case the renewal of diplomatic negotiations
should fail to settle the Kuldja difficulty was
the principal, if not tho only, subject of
discussion. Tlie decision arrived at is
sufficiently indicated by tlio order of about
30,000 men from tho Caucasus aud Turkestan
to the Kuldja aud Amour districts of the
Chinese frontier. The officers who have been
spoken of as likely to take command ou the
Chinese frontier are Generals Skobeloff, Im-
eritinsky and Todleben. On Sunday last an
officer was sent off post-haste from St. Betcra-
urg with very important instructions to
General Skobeleff, who, according to tlie latest
advices, must have already arrived on the
Trans-Caspian coast. It is, of course, not
known what these instructions arc, but the
opinion generally is that the lekke expedition
is to be postponed and General Skobeleff re
called to exercise his abilities in tlie district of
Kuldja, tlie region where he laid the first stone
of his brilliant reputation. If this tunw out
to be true, a sufficient number of troops, it is
to be presumed, will have to be left in the
Trans-Caspian country to keep tlie Tekkea at
bay. Your readers will probably have no
ticed the formatiou of a considerable force of
troops in Eastern Siberia, consisting of a bri
gade of Chasseurs aud Cossacks, aud this is
no doubt in response to tbe key-note of pre
paration which has been struck. As far as
my 'information goes it has been decided to
act mostly on tbe defensive, a course ' which,
all tilings considered, would be tlie safest for
the Russians in the event of war. With tbis
intention the Russian fleet would not blockade
any of the Chinese ports where trade with
Europe is carried on, but would confine itself
chiefly to the waters between Japan and the
coast of the Trans-Amour district, and thus
prevent Japan, it she should have any such
intention, front interfering in the quarrel on
the side of China.
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