Please wait. Contacting image service... loading

Article text

COMMENTS ON CABLE NEWS.
We are now told that General Kuroki's
scouts are within 91 miles of Liao-yang.
If so, the , chances are that, a detachment
ha3 marched due west from tlie Feug-3liin
l'nss upon the Cho-san ridge, tlie east end
of which lcs to tlie south-west of Liao-
yang and some eight miles southerly. Tho
town itself is not worth defending, for if
the ridge is carried from its northern
slopes the town can be comfortably shelled,
the more so as we know General Kuroki
has with him a number of 4.7-inch guns,
which are good for 12,099 yards. It may
be of interest to mention that one of the
reasons alleged for the slow movement of
General Kuroki, to whose operations the
other armies of Generals Nodzu and Oku
have conformed, is tlie construction of the
railway from An-tung to tho Motien Pass.
This has made rapid progress, and it is in
tended to link up with the Russian line
from Liao-yang to the. Motien Pass, most
of which has been completed.
The Russians would appear to attach the
greatest importance to the Motien Pass
position, otherwise an attack in force to dis
lodge tho Japanese would not have been
made. Major-General Kashtalinsky distin
guished himself at the Ynlu, and if his ad
vice had been taken by Lieutenant-General
Sassulitch, the Russians would not have
suffered as they did in actual loss of men
and material, and, worse still, in prestige.
This officer is the only one of the Russians
who, up till now, has made a true report
on events. Licutenant-Gencral Count Kel
ler, from Russia, replaced Lieutenant-Gene-
ral Sassulitch in command of the Second
Siberian Army Corps, but seems no more
callable. The attack on the Motien
l'ass was made from the direc
tion of Sun-Uia-tse, which lies to
tlie north-west, and an attempt seems to.
have been made, under cover of a heavy fog,
to force the Japanese positions extending
from the north to the west of the pass.
At first tlie Russians made headway owing
to surprise and superior numbers;' but
directly the Japanese began to develop
their defence mutters took a "different
turn. _ 1
Tlie Russians attribute their failure to
the superior numbers of the Japanese. That
alone is a confession of the sound organisa
tion of blie Japanese, which enabled them,
or. short notice, to bring sufficient strength
to bear to repulse so powerful nn attack.
Reuter's correspondent flatly contradicts
General Kuropatkin's report, which had
read very well, and had quite an air of can
dor. lteuter s correspondent states ex
plicitly that the Russians were twice as
strong as they were at the Yalu, while the
Japanese only had one brigade and a bat
talion — that ib, seven battalions, or rather
under 7990 men, for the battalions are un
likely to be at full strength. At the Yalu,
though' there were two divisions, or 24 bat
talions, plus artillery and cavalry, available,
tlie Japanese attacked in such a direction
that they could throw an overwhelming
force against tho position in front of and
at Kiu-lien-tsc, held by under 10,009 men,
with the result that tlie Russians were
practically 'wiped out. Wc tukc it that the
attack on the Mo-tien pass was meant for
business, and that a couple of Russian di
visions were engaged, giving about 22,000,
inord or less. The'Japannse have now three
times proved their brilliancy in attack;
they liitve now proved their ability to cling
to a p'osition in adverse circumstances
and brilliantly repulse the enemy. The
Russian "casualties are more likclv to be as
Reuter's correspondent states than tlie
total given by, General Kuropatkin. Con
sidering the small number of the Japanese
engaged, it is ridiculous to suppose that the
lighting extended over an arc 40 miles in
length, from the south-west of the pass
away to the north-east. It was simply an
attack on the nmiu position at the Mo-ticu
pass.
The Russian programme, as reported to
| be developed by the embassy at Rome, is
, good. It in symmetrical, and commands re
spect for its deliberation and moderation,
and it gives promise of fulfilment— always
provided that the Japanese acquiesce and
oblige. Possibly the Russians are 'trusting
over much to Japanese politeness. '
When the history of the war comes to
he writ/ten, Niu-chwang will hold a large
place, not from its strategical importance,
now nil, but from its capacity to propngnto
rnmm-a. Tl« lit ( n ....... 1 i ... I, i..„
the press; the Russians apparently rose to
tlie bait, and they cannot make up their
minds to lenve it alone. They could not
possibly li'old R in the face of a determined
Jnpancse landing; they cannot now hold it
in the face of a very weak landing. They
want every man Ho put in line between Ta-
shih-chiao and H-ai-chcng, but they keep
going away .and coming back to this fatal
spot. The only conclusion is that it is done
for political reasons; they do not like the
Chinese to suppose that they have to give
it up.
On the 15th the Japanese began to move
from their position about the Sia-ha-ta
foothills and advanced further into the
plain towards Tang-ehi, where General
Kuropatkin is reported to have strongly en
trenched himself, though a later report in
clines us to think that, after all. he has
thought better of it and fallen hack north
westerly towards Hui-cheng. Tang-ehi is
only six miles due east of Ta-shih-ehiao.
If lie did fall back, lie had, of course, to
have a strong rearguard to conceal his
movements. This rearguard would appear
to be a full brigade, 5900 men, deducting
losses and sickness. The statement that
tlie Russians fell hack towards Ta-shih-
chinomak.es us. think that after all General
Kuropatkin will stand between Tang-ehi
and that place, and has not moved his main
force to Ilai-eheng and further north.
$