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I -
THE SUBMARINE IN NAVAL
! WARFARE.
Commenting on the value of the submarine
are in the present naval war, -UlP
"Shipbuilder" remarks that the lay
mind, after the disastrous work of Gti
nian submarines in the North Sea, has
come to look upon the submarine as a
great menace to our naval supremacy As
a weapon of destruction, however, ac
cording to the authority quoted, the submarine
is not yet perfect, whatever it
may become, and if is reasonable to pro
dict that the possibilities of protection
against torpedo attack the submarine
counter-attack will some day limit effective
under inter offence According
to the pro-submarine partly a theory before
the war, submarines would at least
render futile the blockade of a toast by
a hostile fleet, tile defending submarines
working from Vir various bases being
capable of destroying the blockading ves
seas But when it is remembered that
the largest fleet in the world is at present
blockading the coast of Germany,
and has done so since the beginning of
August, and is still in existence and a
wholly intact, it must be conceded that
then theory has not been borne out by
experience The weather and geographical
situation during this period have been
ideal of submarine! warfare, and the
enemy's fleet is second only in strength
to that of the blockading fleet, and contains
many highly efficient under-water
vessels All the damage the enemy's submarines
have been able to do so far is to
sink a few of the older cruisers not engaged
in the blockading operations, but
in patrol work elsewhere, and two of
the casualties were the result of praise
worthy. though mistaken, efforts on the
part of the two ships concerned to save
the crew of a third vessel Moreover,.
but for the treacherous use of a neutral
deg, flown by ships which concealed the
presence of the underwater enemy, it is
probable that the Hogue, Cressy, abou
ker, and Hawke would still! be perform-
me their duties As to the effect of a
submarine attack on a Dreadnought, many
but exceptional cases the submarine
can only reckon on one torpedo hit, for
the percentage of his, so far as is known,
is only three to five per cent in view
of the extensive and intricate subdivision
of the latest battleships, it seems reason
able to suppose that a single torpedo
would not move fatal At present our
fleet has three possible methods of defence
against a submarine attack, name
ly. (1) fleet tactics, (2) gun file, and (3)
mines and nets The first two have
proved successful so far in the present
blockading operations V submarine attack
is met by manoeuvring at full speed
after the discovery of the enemy's ap
coach, autocratic course is steered. and
the guns are manned and ready. The
submarine, if it wishes to pursue the attack,
is forced to rise to the surface for
observation purposes, and at once be-
come an object of gun fire. The destroyer
flotilla of the attacked fleet is an additional
danger to the under-water vessel.
These fast, easily manoeuvred boats per-
form evolutions round the capital cities,
and render the work of the submarine
doubly hazardous to itself and less dangerous
to the attacked fleet. The experience
of the first three months of this war
(she "Shipbuilder" considers) points to
the conclusion that a new fleet unit will
be evolved capable of repulsing under-
water attack. It would almost appear
that the destroyer of the submarine must
herself be of the submersible type, larger
and more powerful than the submarine
proper, and incidentally combining in
her offensive power methods of dealing
with aircraft. The data derived from
the present war will point the road along
which progress is desirable; and, once
having a more or less concrete idea of
the salient features which a destroyer
of submarines must embody the evolu-
tion of a suitable design will not present
the difficulty it did prior to the naval
struggle between Great Britain and Germany.
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