Team selection with asymmetric agents / by Katerina Sherstyuk Sherstyuk, Katerina

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Sherstyuk, Katerina
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Equilibrium (Economics) - Mathematical models.; Agency theory -- Models; Equilibrium (Economics) -- Models
The robustness of results of one-period team selection studies reported by Bolle (1994) in which subjects often did not exhibit the Nash equilibrium behavior but resorted to tacit collusion is tested. To this end, asymmetry is introduced into subjects' characteristics and the experiment is repeated for a number of periods. Results show that collusion is not sustainable, with the outcomes approximating the Nash equilibrium. However, the agent's actions remain a little bit above the Nash equilibrium level.
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e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

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