Optimal duplication of effort in advocacy systems Palumbo, Giuliana

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Palumbo, Giuliana
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Manipulation (Securities) -- Prevention; Transfer pricing; Economics
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.12.005 Byline: Giuliana Palumbo Keywords: Advocacy; Information creation; Manipulation; Monitoring Abstract: The paper focuses on the creation of information for decision-making when agents' effort is non-observable and rewards are indirect, that is, only based on the final decision. Following Dewatripont and Tirole [Dewatripont, M., Tirole, J., 1999. Advocates. Journal of Political Economy 107, 1-39], the paper shows that the creation of advocates of special interests, as opposed to non-partisans, generates an efficient mechanism of mutual monitoring that reduces the scope for manipulation. Such monitoring is preferable over imposing penalties for detected manipulation; it is also preferable to creating an agency that monitors the non-partisan agent. Applications to transfer price policies and comparative judicial systems are considered. Author Affiliation: Bank of Italy, Law and Economics Research Department, Via Milano 60/g, 00184 Rome, Italy Article History: Received 24 January 2002; Accepted 22 December 2003
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