Collusion in private value ascending price auctions / by Katerina Sherstyuk Sherstyuk, Katerina

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Author
Sherstyuk, Katerina
Appears In
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subjects
Auctions - Mathematical models.; Prices -- Models; Auctions -- Models
Audience
Academic
Summary
A model indicates that collusion in price auctions cannot be totally eliminated by stricter rules; collusion is more likely to occur with higher payoffs.
Bookmark
https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/218283
Work ID
218283

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