Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy Leeson, Peter T

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Author
Leeson, Peter T
Appears In
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subjects
Economics; Business; Political aspects
Audience
Academic
Summary
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.06.022 Byline: Peter T. Leeson Abstract: Self-enforcing arrangements are crucial to the study of African political econmy. The weakness of formal governance in much of Africa makes understanding informal institutions of cooperation particularly important. I consider the application of self-enforcing arrangements, like those described by the Ostroms, to the problems of violence and social heterogeneity that plague Africa. Author Affiliation: Department of Economics, George Mason University, MSN 3G4, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
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https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/215247
Work ID
215247

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