English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies Jeffrey M. Lacker; John A. Weinberg

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/74946
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies
Author
  • Jeffrey M. Lacker
  • John A. Weinberg
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • We reexamine the core in the adverse selection insurance economy first studied by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Defining blocking in a way that takes private information into account, the core is sometimes empty. We define the coalition-proof core as the set of allocations which are blocked only by allocations which are themselves blocked by coalition- proof allocations. This definition is closely related to Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium, introduced by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987). We prove that the coalition-proof core consists of the Miyazaki allocation--the Pareto-optimal allocation most preferred by low-risk agents. The coalition-proof core is always nonempty in this economy and has attractive continuity properties. Cross-subsidization can occur in the coalition-proof core.
  • Economics
  • RePEc:fip:fedrwp:94-09
Language
  • English
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