Draft constitution and the decision-making rule for the Council of Ministers of the EU – Looking for alternative solution
A priori voting power analysis can provide an effective tool for assessment of decision-making rules, which is particularly needed in procedures using weighted voting. The Council of the EU is such a case and the decision-making rule for this main decision-making body is a long-lasting problem of the European Union. This article aims at designing an equitable and politically acceptable solution to this problem while at the same time provides a comparison of the qualities of the proposed rule with the rule as given by the Treaty of Nice, by the Draft Treaty on Constitution and by another proposal, which was presented as an optimal solution.
Nice Treaty; Constitution for Europe; Council of Ministers; qualified majority; majority voting; political science
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