English, Article edition: Zur Glaubwürdigkeit des EWU-Stabilitätspaktes – Einfache Berechnungen und mehrfache Zweifel Sutter, Matthias

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/66854
Physical Description
  • article
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Zur Glaubwürdigkeit des EWU-Stabilitätspaktes – Einfache Berechnungen und mehrfache Zweifel
Author
  • Sutter, Matthias
Physical Description
  • article
Notes
  • This article deals with the stability and growth pact the EU´s heads of state or government approved in Amsterdam in June 1997. The pact´s aim is to provide budgetary discipline in Stage 3 of European Monetary Union in order to ensure a stable common currency and the European Central Bank´s independence. Excessive deficits are evaluated by taking into account real GDP growth. The forthcoming regulation is not to include the specific growth rates which allow for an excessive deficit. This enforces the discretionary elements of a deficit´s evaluation. A hypothetical application of the stability pact for the period 1979 to 1996 and an empirical testing of the deficit´s dependence upon a country´s growth rate both give reason for concern about the credible enforcement of the stability pact in future EMU. A game-theoretic approach supports these conclusions. Therefore an institutional reform is proposed which is to distribute a nation´s voting power in the european council according to Art. 148 EC-treaty and its average budget deficit over the last two years. By implementing such a „double weighting" of votes the budgetary disciplined countries´ bargaining position could be strenghtened and the acceptance of a large monetary union improved.
  • EMU; stability pact; economics
  • RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0013
Language
  • English
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