English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting Gea Myoung Lee

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/6195
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting
Author
  • Gea Myoung Lee
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two firms play an infinitely repeated Bertrand game when each firm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding firms, fixing prices, allocate market shares based on the agent’s information as to cost types. We emphasize that the presence of privately-informed agents may provide firms with a strategic opportunity to exploit an interaction between internal contracting and market-sharing arrangement: the contracts with agents may be used to induce firms’ truthful communication in their collusion, and collusive market-share allocation may act to reduce the agents’ information rents.
  • Optimal collusion, internal contract, privately-informed agents, price-fixing
  • RePEc:siu:wpaper:08-2008
Language
  • English
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