English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society Sebastian Kranz

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/52720
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society
Author
  • Sebastian Kranz
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000092
  • This paper analyses competition of moral norms and institutions in a society where a fixed share of people unconditionally complies with norms and the remaining people act selfishly. Whether a person is a norm-complier or selfish is private knowledge. A model of voting-by-feet shows that those norms and institutions arise that maximize expected utility of norm-compliers, taken into account selfish players' behavior. Such complier optimal norms lead to a simple behavioral model that, when combined with preferences for equitable outcomes, is in line with the relevant stylized facts from a wide range of economic experiments, like reciprocal behavior, costly punishment, the role of intentions, giving in dictator games and concerns for social efficiency. The paper contributes to the literature on voting-by-feet, institutional design, ethics and social preferences.
  • moral norms, social preferences, fairness, reciprocity, rule utilitarianism, voting-by-feet, farsighted-stability, cultural evolution, golden rule, social norms
  • RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse11_2006
Language
  • English
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