Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents’ strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, there may be either a first-mover or a second-mover advantage. Under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium, but he will not implement first-best efforts although the agents are risk neutral.
In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to,
you must first login
or sign up.
Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by
clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.