Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal - Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model
We present a common value mechanism design model for an informed principal where only the principal has private information, but her one-dimensional private information is allowed to be distributed according to any probability measure. For this model we characterize the set of pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. Furthermore, we present several equilibrium refinements based on the concept of equilibrium domination to take account of beliefs off the equilibrium path. Finally, we demonstrate that the extension of the strong solution of Myerson (Econometrica, 1983) to our model is supported as an equilibrium satisfying all refinement criteria presented (in case a strong solution exists).
In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to,
you must first login
or sign up.
Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by
clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.