Minimum cost arborescences Dutta, Bhaskar; Mishra, Debasis

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Dutta, Bhaskar ; Mishra, Debasis
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Games and Economic Behavior
Psychology and mental health; Analysis
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: Byline: Bhaskar Dutta (a), Debasis Mishra (b) Keywords: Directed networks; Cost allocation; Core stability; Continuity; Cost monotonicity Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms representing incentive and fairness properties. We show that while some results are similar, there are also significant differences between the frameworks corresponding to symmetric and asymmetric cost matrices. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, England, United Kingdom (b) Indian Statistical Institute, 7 S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India Article History: Received 10 August 2010 Article Note: (footnote) [star] We are most grateful to two referees and an associate editor whose extensive comments have significantly improved the paper, and to Ibrahim Baris Esmerok for pointing out an error in an earlier version of the paper. We thank Daniel Granot, Anirban Kar, and Herve Moulin for comments.
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