An Economic Analysis of the Private Health Insurance Incentive Act (1998) Rhema Vaithianathan

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Rhema Vaithianathan
Economics; Health
This paper by Rhema Vaithianathan argues that since insurers are able to design plans to separate risk groups, the consequences of adverse selection - one of the bases for the introduction of the Private Health Insurance Incentive Act (1998) - may have been exaggerated.
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