Who Is Punishing Corrupt Politicians – Voters or the Central Government? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program
In the literature, evidence suggests that the probability of a politician's re-election decreases with the number of corruption violations reported before the municipal elections. Exploiting the exogenous variation in the release of the audit reports and the Brazilian institutional scheme, this paper disentangles the channels through which the Brazilian anti-corruption program acts. After the release of the audit reports, municipalities where more than two corruption violations were reported receive 25% fewer transfers from the CG. Furthermore, the eects of the dissemination of corruption information on the probability of re-election for incumbent mayors seem to gradually disappear with time. Then, when the effects of the dissemination of corruption information have completely faded, voters punish corrupt politicians as a consequence of the reduction in transfers. The results suggest that voters care about transfers and may anticipate punishment by the CG when local corruption is released before the municipal elections.
In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to,
you must first login
or sign up.
Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by
clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.