English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: On the Existence of Strategic Solutions for Games with Security- and Potential Level Players Zimper, Alexander

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/42830
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • On the Existence of Strategic Solutions for Games with Security- and Potential Level Players
Author
  • Zimper, Alexander
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • This paper examines the existence of strategic solutions for finite normal form games under the assumption that strategy choices can be described as choices among lotteries where players have security- and potential level preferences over lotteries (e.g., Gilboa, 1988; Jaffray, 1988; Cohen, 1992). Since security- and potential level preferences require discontinuous utility representations, standard existence results for Nash equilibria in mixed strategies (Nash, 1950a,b) or for equilibria in beliefs (Crawford, 1990) do not apply. As a key insight this paper proves that non-existence of equilibria in beliefs, and therefore non-existence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, is possible in finite games with security- and potential level players. But, as this paper also shows, rationalizable strategies (Bernheim, 1984; Moulin, 1984; Pearce, 1984) exist for such games. Rationalizability rather than equilibrium in beliefs therefore appears to be a more favorable solution concept for games with security- and potential level players.
  • RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:04-04
Language
  • English
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