English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents Peters, Michael

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Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents
Author
  • Peters, Michael
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter examples to both these theorems when there are multiple agents.
  • RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-03-12-17-12-42-59
Language
  • English
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