Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting Han, Seungjin

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Author
Han, Seungjin
Appears In
Journal of Economic Theory
Subjects
Game theory -- Methods; Game theory -- Usage; Contracts -- Forecasts and trends
Audience
Academic
Summary
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.002 Byline: Seungjin Han Abstract: This paper studies bilateral contracting where multiple principals negotiate contracts with multiple agents independently. It is shown that pure-strategy equilibrium allocations relative to any ad hoc set of feasible mechanisms are supported by pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria relative to the set of menus. This paper also shows that all equilibrium allocations to any ad hoc set of feasible mechanisms are supported by correlated equilibria relative to the set of menus, where a state is a probability distribution function over payoff-relevant variables. Furthermore, all equilibrium allocations relative to the set of menus persist even if principals use more complex mechanisms. Author Affiliation: Department of Economics, McMaster University, Kenneth Talyor Hall, Room 421, 1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, Ont., Canada L8S 4M4 Article History: Received 27 February 2004; Revised 14 April 2005
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http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/37362
Work ID
37362

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e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

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