What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach Marmer, Vadim; Shneyerov, Artyom; Xu, Pai

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Marmer, Vadim ; Shneyerov, Artyom ; Xu, Pai
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Journal of Econometrics
Auctions -- Analysis; Auctions -- Models; Models
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2013.04.005 Byline: Vadim Marmer, Artyom Shneyerov, Pai Xu Abstract: We develop a selective entry model for first-price auctions that nests two polar models often estimated in the empirical literature on auctions, Levin and Smith (1994), and Samuelson (1985). The selective entry model features a pro-competitive selection effect. The selection effect is shown to be nonparametrically identifiable, and a nonparametric test for its presence is proposed. This test can be used to discriminate between the two polar models. Article History: Received 18 February 2011; Revised 23 October 2012; Accepted 9 April 2013
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