English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: "Watch-dogs" vs. supervisor-agent collusion: an economic theory of codes of conduct for public administrators. Lorenzo Sacconi

User activity

Share to:
 
Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/37049
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • "Watch-dogs" vs. supervisor-agent collusion: an economic theory of codes of conduct for public administrators.
Author
  • Lorenzo Sacconi
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • In this essay I suggest a first-best solution to the collusion problem in a three-levels principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy (Tirole 1986, Laffont-Tirole 1993) in the context of a repeated games model. I introduce a new player in the component game i.e. a group of consumers which is also modelled as the constituency of the principal. An ex ante incomplete constitutional contract of authorisation links the principal to the group of consumer. At the next move in the game the group of consumers has a choice on the level of support and compliance to the principal’s authority, which I intend as a specific investment. Due to the incompleteness of contracts problem, according to the economic theory of corporate culture (Kreps 1990) and code of ethics (Sacconi 1997), the principal may only announce a code of basic principles of good administration, being not automatically enforceable. In the repeated game among the three levels hierarchy and an infinite series of short-lived groups of consumers/​supporters, I prove by a reputation effects construction (Fudenberg-Levine 1989, 1992) that the first best contract offered by the principal to the supervisor and the agent is part of a self-enforcing equilibrium profile making possible to the principal to get a payoff that approximates the Stakelberg payoff in nearly all the component games.
  • RePEc:liu:liucec:41
Language
  • English
Contributed by
OAIster

Get this edition

Other links

  • Set up My libraries

    How do I set up "My libraries"?

    In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to, you must first login or sign up. Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.

  • All (1)
  • Unknown (1)
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.

User activity


e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this edition

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this version

Add a comment