Monetary Policy and Learning from the Central Bank's Forecast
We examine the expectational stability (E-stability) of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in a simple New Keynesian model in which private agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank's forecast. In this environment, to satisfy the E-stability condition, the central bank must respond more strongly to the expected inflation rate than the so-called Taylor principle suggests. On the other hand, the central bank's strong reaction to the expected inflation rate raises the possibility of indeterminacy of the REE. In considering these problems, a robust policy is to respond to the current inflation rate to a certain degree.
Adaptive Learning, E-stability, New Keynesian Model, Monetary Policy, Taylor principle
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