Best-of-three all-pay auctions Sela, Aner

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Sela, Aner
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Economics Letters
Auctions - Econometric models.; Auctions; Economics
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: Byline: Aner Sela Abstract: We study a best-of-three all-pay auction. It is shown that with values of winning and without values of losing, this auction is less productive (the players' total expected effort is smaller) than the one-stage all-pay auction. However, with different values of losing over the contest's stages it may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction. Article History: Received 15 April 2010; Revised 20 February 2011; Accepted 24 March 2011
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