Best-of-three all-pay auctions Sela, Aner

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Author
Sela, Aner
Appears In
Economics Letters
Subjects
Auctions - Econometric models.; Auctions; Economics
Audience
Academic
Summary
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.021 Byline: Aner Sela Abstract: We study a best-of-three all-pay auction. It is shown that with values of winning and without values of losing, this auction is less productive (the players' total expected effort is smaller) than the one-stage all-pay auction. However, with different values of losing over the contest's stages it may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction. Article History: Received 15 April 2010; Revised 20 February 2011; Accepted 24 March 2011
Bookmark
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/3254000
Work ID
3254000

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