Joint production in teams Battaglini, Marco

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Author
Battaglini, Marco
Appears In
Journal of Economic Theory
Subjects
Cost control -- Methods; Production management -- Methods; Economics
Audience
Academic
Summary
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.005 Byline: Marco Battaglini (a)(b) Abstract: Consider Holmstrom's moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has an a.sub.i-dimensional strategy space and output is m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation generically exists if and only if a.sub.i=1.sup.na.sub.i/(n-1)<m. Moreover, under a weak additional condition, the equilibrium implemented by this mechanism is unique in the class of pure strategy Coalition-Proof equilibria. Author Affiliation: (a) Economics Department, Princeton University, 001 Fisher Hall, Princeton NJ 08544-1021, USA (b) CEPR Article History: Received 10 January 2003; Revised 18 May 2005
Bookmark
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/297711
Work ID
297711

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