Coalition-proof implementation Boylan, Richard T

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Author
Boylan, Richard T
Appears In
Journal of Economic Theory
Subjects
Economics; Equilibrium (Economics) -- Models; Business
Audience
Academic
Summary
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2424 Byline: Richard T. Boylan Abstract: A new condition is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) implementation in environments with complete information. This result implies that all choice functions are CPNE-implementable when individuals' utility functions are bounded with respect to all variables -- except for money -- and are either analytic or quasi-linear.Journal Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D72, D78. Author Affiliation: Washington University, Olin School of Business, St. Louis, Missouri, 63130 Article History: Received 7 July 1996; Revised 23 March 1998
Bookmark
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/296788
Work ID
296788

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