English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Reputation and Career Concerns Leonardo Martinez

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/30394
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Reputation and Career Concerns
Author
  • Leonardo Martinez
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • Does a worker who had a successful career have stronger or weaker incentives to manipulate his reputation than a worker who performed poorly? This paper presents a tractable model that allows us to study career concerns when the strength of a worker’s incentives depends on his employment history (the history of his past actions, jobs, and performances). More specifically, the paper incorporates standard job assignments into the main model in Holmstrom’s (1999) seminal paper on career concerns. Equilibrium wages, equilibrium job assignments, and the strength of career-concern incentives are the same for all employment histories that lead to the same worker's reputation. (With reputation we refer to beliefs about the worker's future productivity.) We show that, typically, workers with a better reputation have stronger incentives than workers with a worse reputation. Furthermore, we show that when the strength of incentives depends on employment history, (i) a ratchet effect may appear, (ii) in spite of this ratchet effect, incentives may be stronger, and (iii) incentives may be stronger when beliefs about ability are more precise. ; Previous title: Reputation and career concerns
  • Stochastic analysis
  • RePEc:fip:fedrwp:06-01
  • This paper studies Holmstrom's [1999] seminal model of career concerns, but considers that a small change in the beliefs about the agent's future productivity may imply a large change in his compensation---because, for example, the agent may be fired or promoted. This allows us to study how the agent's effort decision depends on his current reputation---with reputation we refer to the beliefs about the agent's future productivity. We shall show that the market's and the agent's problems can be written recursively. We find that the relationship between the agent's decisions and his current reputation is typically nonmonotonic: equilibrium effort is hump-shaped over reputation. Furthermore, equilibrium effort may be higher if there is less dispersion in the distribution of abilities; it may be higher later in the agent's career; and it may be higher than the efficient effort level
  • career concerns, reputation, agency, learning, dynamic games, promotions, firing
  • RePEc:red:sed006:853
Language
  • English
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