JOB SEARCH WITH BIDDER MEMORIES.(Report) Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Menzio, Guido; Smith, Eric

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Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos ; Menzio, Guido ; Smith, Eric
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International Economic Review
Job hunting -- Analysis; Employers -- Human resource management; Analysis
Academic; Trade
To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: Byline: Carlos Carrillo-Tudela ([dagger]), Guido Menzio ([dagger]), Eric Smith (1) Abstract: This article revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds. Author Affiliation: ([dagger])University of Essex, U.K.; University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; University of Essex, U.K., Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, U.S.A.
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