English, Article edition: Ideals in sequential bargaining structures Ana Paula Martins

User activity

Share to:
 
Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/29110
Physical Description
  • article
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Ideals in sequential bargaining structures
Author
  • Ana Paula Martins
Physical Description
  • article
Notes
  • Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to suggest possible extensions of the baseline Rubinstein sequential bargaining structure – applied to the negotiation of stationary infinitely termed contracts – that incorporate a direct reference to the “ideal” utilities of the players. This is a feature of the Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solution – even if not of the generalized Nash maximand; it is usually not encountered in non-cooperative equilibria. Design/​methodology/​approach – First, it is argued that different bargaining protocols than conventionally staged are able to incorporate temporary all-or (and)-nothing splits of the pie. Scenarios are advanced where such episodes are interpreted either as – out of bargaining – war or unilateral appropriation events, or free experience contracts. Second, some modifications to the Rubinstein infinite horizon paradigm are experimented with, allowing for mixed strategies under alternate offers, and matching or synchronous decisions in a simultaneous (yet, discrete) bargaining environment. Solutions are derived where the reference to the winner-takes-it-all outcome arises as a parallel – out-of-the-protocol – outside option to the status quo point. In some cases, the limiting maximand for instantaneous bargaining was derived. Findings – Rubinstein's optimal periodic division in a closed contract remained robust to most of the settings. Originality/​value – Presents possible extensions of the baseline Rubinstein sequential bargaining structure.
  • Apprenticeships, Economic equilibrium, Mixed economies, Process planning, Protocols
  • RePEc:eme:ijsepp:v:34:y:2007:i:11:p:828-882
Language
  • English
Contributed by
OAIster

Get this edition

  • Set up My libraries

    How do I set up "My libraries"?

    In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to, you must first login or sign up. Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.

  • All (1)
  • Unknown (1)
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.

User activity


e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this edition

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this version

Add a comment