A Eficiência do Estado e as Concessões Rodoviárias no Brasil: Preocupação com o valor do pedágio e sugestões para operacionalizar a modicidade das tarifas
Carlos Álvares da Silva Campos Neto
Ricardo Pereira Soares
The granting of highway concession in Brazil has been motivated by the shortage of public funds, which led the Union and some states to give out concessions of about 10.500 km of highway to be operated by private enterprises. This occurred between 1994 and 1999. It has been observed that among the five concessions given out by the federal government a real increase in the toll fee has occurred. This increase outperformed the inflation index variation IPCA/IBGE by 45%, between 1995 and 2006. It has become evident that the persistent real gains in the toll fees throughout time are related to highway concession contract norms, mainly the ones concerned with economic financial ratio. The concept of economic financial ratio, which appeals to the private sector, was studied and set in motion. On the other hand, the need of a more even minded treatment regarding consumer interests as the concept of affordable tariffs did not receive due attention. By means of this study, the authors propose a new concept for toll affordability: a principle that allows, during the period of contract, users to share economic gains, productivity gains with the leaser of a concession, as well as additional revenue gains obtained concession undertakings. According to this concept toll affordability will be defined at the revenue end, that is, additional revenues to the foreseen ones and economic gains must be shared with the users. It must be pointed out that economic financial ratio is first of all operative in terms of protection for leaders of concession cost alterations. Thus, the economic financial ratio protects the leaser of a concession regarding cost impacts and toll moderateness benefits users by sharing of economic gains, productivity and additional revenue. Therefore, these are principles that complement each other. The concession granting power would gain efficiency in its regulatory function if it incorporated four alternatives aiming at operating the toll affordability concept to be implemented by the firms within the concession contracts: Repay part of the productivity gains to the leaser of the concession, share the risk of number of vehicles between the leaser of the concession and users, share additional revenues between the leaser of the concession and users, and, pay back in terms of price variation part of the economic gains stemming from credit risk reduction. The study suggests that a mechanism which can be adapted in order to encourage competition between firms active in natural monopoly markets is a dispute by means of concessions, provided that tenders are designed for compatible durations according to expectations of revenues and investments in each project. Duration adequateness, beside the expected benefits for the users would create additional benefits, because it diminished the entrance barrier for the highway concession business. To comply with this suggestion the issue of concessions´ duration must be treated when set out for tender like a variable with economic characteristics. For each project the duration of contract should be related to the size of the necessary investments as well as to the return rate on investment and the demand (number of vehicles), all part of the calculus to determine the time needed to pay back the initial investment of the project.
In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to,
you must first login
or sign up.
Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by
clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.