Incentives for helping on the job : theory and evidence / Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey Drago, Robert

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Author
Drago, Robert
Appears In
Journal of Labor Economics
Subjects
Incentives in industry - Econometric models.; Australia.; Helping behavior -- Case studies
Audience
Academic; Trade
Summary
Recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers' performance through "helping" efforts. This article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation. The model is tested with Australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups. The evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced, while individual efforts are increased, when promotion incentives are strong. Piece rates and profit-sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts, while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated.
Bookmark
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/220941
Work ID
220941

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