English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information LOVO, Stefano; HÖRNER, Johanes

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/23068
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information
Author
  • LOVO, Stefano
  • HÖRNER, Johanes
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • In this paper, the authors define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players’ continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. They characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
  • game theory; equilibria; information
  • RePEc:ebg:heccah:0845
Language
  • English
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