English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Dynamically Stable Preferences Thomas Norman

User activity

Share to:
 
Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/21156
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Dynamically Stable Preferences
Author
  • Thomas Norman
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents repeatedly matched to play a symmetric 2 x 2 game in biological fitnesses. Each agent is biased in favor of one of the strategies, and receives a noisy signal of his and his opponent`s bias. With sufficiently accurate signals, the resulting global game selects a unique outcome, allowing preference biases to be shaped by the replicator dynamics. Stability analysis in this setting requires the extension of recent techniques for evolution on infinite strategy spaces, introducing new setwise stability concepts. In coordination games, the interval of preference biases supporting the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is Lyapunov stable and weakly attracting, by virtue of constituting a "strongly uninvadable set". In Prisoners` Dilemmas that satisfy Kandori and Rob`s (Games and Economic Behavior 22, 1998, 30-60) "marginal bandwagon property", meanwhile, an interval of biases supporting efficient cooperation is a "neutrally uninvadable set", and thus Lyapunov stable.
  • Evolution, Preferences, Global Games, Replicator Dynamics, Continuous Strategy Space, Evolutionary Stability
  • RePEc:oxf:wpaper:207
Language
  • English
Contributed by
OAIster

Get this edition

Other links

  • Set up My libraries

    How do I set up "My libraries"?

    In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to, you must first login or sign up. Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.

  • All (1)
  • Unknown (1)
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.

User activity


e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this edition

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this version

Add a comment