Revealed and Concealed Preferences in the Chilean Pension System: An Experimental Investigation
Using survey data and a field experiment to measure agents` risk and time preferences, we identify the agent-type that is free to reveal its preferences through decisions about pension system participation. Thus, we show that in Chile the appropriate focus for policy makers interested in the welfare-enhancing effects of such participation are the self employed. They are indistinguishable from other economically active agents with respect to time and risk preferences and sort into participants and non-participants in the pension system with reference to those preferences. In contrast, employees are rationed. The more patient and less risk averse self employed participate.
field experiment, time preference, risk aversion, pension reform, self employment
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