English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities Sergio Currarini; Francesco Feri

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/203746
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities
Author
  • Sergio Currarini
  • Francesco Feri
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an externalities on non contractors. The principal can either contract both agents in a centralized manner, or delegate one agent to contract the other. We show that the choice of the principal depends on the sign of the externality. If this is positive, the principal prefers to delegate as long as the agency costs are not too high; if the externality is negative, the principal prefers to centralize for all sizes of agency costs.
  • Contracts, Externalities, Centralization, Delegation.
  • RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_15
Language
  • English
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