English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence Nicolas Jacquemet; Yannick Gabuthy; Nadège Marchand

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/200450
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence
Author
  • Nicolas Jacquemet
  • Yannick Gabuthy
  • Nadège Marchand
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00259453_v1
  • This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovativebargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising fromInternet-based transactions. The main result shows that the settlement rule tends to chillbargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations, whichimplies that automated negotiation is not able to promote agreements. However, this perverseeffect depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs ismore credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested inmaximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. The implications ofthese results are then used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputationmechanisms in Cyberspace
  • : Online Dispute Resolution, Electronic Commerce, Bargaining, Arbitration,Experimental Economics
  • RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00259453_v1
  • RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0402002
  • arbitration; bargaining; electronic commerce; experimental economics; online dispute
  • RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00178587_v1
  • This paper presents the results of an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. Automated negotiation is an online sealed-bid process in which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within a prescribed range. The observed individual behavior, based on 40 rounds of bargaining, is shown to be drastically affected by the design of automated negotiation. The settlement rule encourages disputants to behave strategically by adopting aggressive bargaining positions, which implies that the mechanism is not able to promote agreements and generate efficiency. This conclusion is consistent with the experimental results on arbitration and the well-known chilling effect: Automated negotiation tends to “chill” bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations and discourage them to converge on their own. However, this perverse effect induced by the settlement rule depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit.
  • Online Dispute Resolution, Arbitration, Experimental Economics, Electronic Commerce, Bargaining
  • RePEc:gat:wpaper:0401
Language
  • English
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