INDEPENDENCE VERSUS ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK - IS THERE ANY SOLUTION?
The article is concerned with analysis of independence of central banks of the EU Member States within the framework of the ESCB, as well as independence and responsibility of the ECB, and suggests an alternative institutional embodiment of its position, reflecting the specific framework of the EMU. The system of selection of members of the ECB's Executive Board blurs a real collective responsibility towards Member States, which opens possibilities for nontransparent lobbyism. Modified system is suggested so that national bank´s governors have a symbolic relationship to the political representation, i.e. that they reflect a national economic policy in some way, without being bound and restricted by its formation whatsoever.
European Central Bank, Economic and Monetary Union, co-ordination of economic policy, central bank's independency, central bank's accountability
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