The article is concerned with voting power indicators in the European Union and one paradox arising from them. The first chapter defines voting power indicators exactly. The second chapter defines the paradox of new members and introduces some examples. The third chapter specifies data - voting power indicators in the EU. The fourth chapter computes differences between old and new voting power indicators. The fifth chapter summarizes the frequency of the paradox of new members in total. The sixth chapter brings a conclusion.
The article is concerned with voting indicators in the European Union. The first chapter constructs a model of voting power and defines four indicators: A. Simple relative power, B. Shapley-Shubik index, C. Banzhaf index, D. Coleman index. The second chapter defines data: the voting structure according the Nice Treaty and nine algorithms - variants of the EU enlargement. The third chapter summarizes empirical results. The fourth chapter discusses statistical relations between voting indicators. The fifth chapter brings conclusions.
voting indicator, quantitative analysis, minimal winning coalitions, index of power, game theory, EU enlargement
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