A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations Prendergast, Canice J

User activity

Share to:
View the summary of this work
Prendergast, Canice J
Appears In
Journal of Labor Economics
Corporate governance -- Analysis; Business enterprises -- Management; Human resources and labor relations
Academic; Trade
This article considers the implications of allowing a manager discretion over task assignment. If employees earn rents from carrying out tasks, and the manager cannot 'sell' the jobs to her subordinates, she has an incentive to take on more tasks than is optimal and delegate too few to a subordinate. I show that although firms can alleviate this incentive by offering output-contingent contracts, even with the optimal contract, (i) the manager carries out too many tasks, (ii) she exerts too much effort on her own tasks, and (iii) her subordinate exerts too little effort on his tasks.
Work ID

2 editions of this work

Find a specific edition
Thumbnail [View as table] [View as grid] Title, Author, Edition Date Language Format Libraries

User activity

e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this work

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this work

Add a comment

Show comments and reviews from Amazon users