English, Article edition: Information Revelation and Principal-Agent Contracts. Alvi, Eskander

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/196169
Physical Description
  • article
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Information Revelation and Principal-Agent Contracts.
Author
  • Alvi, Eskander
Physical Description
  • article
Notes
  • In an environment in which effort is private information to the worker, agreements between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-a verse agent are likely to be risk-sharing and information-revealing m echanisms. It is shown that principal-agent contracts have significan t implications for both compensation and employment rules in a simple work-sharing model. In general, such contracts involve incomplete in come insurance and involuntary or excessive underemployment. This sup ports the view that models of worker-specific information, particular ly with moral hazard, provide a natural explanation of underemploymen t. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.
  • RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:6:y:1988:i:1:p:132-46
Language
  • English
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