English, Article edition: Contingent Fees, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents: A Laboratory Experiment Michael McKee; Rudy Santore; Joel Shelton

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/195350
Physical Description
  • article
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Contingent Fees, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents: A Laboratory Experiment
Author
  • Michael McKee
  • Rudy Santore
  • Joel Shelton
Physical Description
  • article
Notes
  • When attorney effort is not verifiable, previous theoretical work has found that a competitive legal services market may yield an equilibrium contingent fee that is strictly greater than the zero-profit contingent fee. However, these results require fairly sophisticated consumers who recognize that lower contingent fees do not induce sufficient attorney effort. This paper reports on tests of these predictions in an experimental setting.
  • RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:36:y:2007:p:253-273
Language
  • English
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