English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment Theodore C. Bergstrom; Oded Stark

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/189972
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment
Author
  • Theodore C. Bergstrom
  • Oded Stark
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:1101
  • Why are economists convinced that {\it homo economicus}\/​ is selfish? No doubt we find considerable support for this hypothesis in the behavior of our colleagues. Beyond this, a plausible evolutionary argument for selfishness would assert that if natural selection favors those who receive high payoffs, and if altruists get lower payoffs than selfish individuals, then evolution will tend to eliminate altruists. In this paper, we will show that, paradoxically, evolution can sustain cooperative behavior between relatives or neighbors even in single-shot prisoner's dilemma models, where cooperation benefits one's opponent at a cost to oneself.
  • RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9401001
  • This paper considers a series of examples in which evolution supports cooperative behavior in single-shot prisoners' dilemma. Examples include genetic inheritance for asexual siblings and for sexual diploid siblings. We also study two models of ``cultural inheritance''; one in which siblings copy either their parents or an extrafamilial role model and one in which neighbors arrayed along a circular road copy successful neighbors. Finally, we consider a model in which parents choose their behavior, realizing that it may be imitated by their children. A unifying principle in these models is that cooperative behavior more is likely to be sustained in environments where relatively successful organisms are copied relatively often and where organisms that have the same role model are more likely to interact with each other than with a randomly selected member of the population.
  • RePEc:wop:michec:_024
  • This paper considers a series of examples in which evolution supports cooperative behavior in single-shot prisoners' dilemma. Examples include genetic inheritance for asexual siblings and for sexual diploid siblings. We also study two models of ``cultural inheritance''; one in which siblings copy either their parents or an extrafamilial role model and one in which neighbors arrayed along a circular road copy successful neighbors. Finally, we consider a model in which parents choose their behavior, realizing that it may be imitated by their children. A unifying principle of these models is that cooperative behavior more is likely to be sustained in environments where relatively successful organisms are copied relatively often and where organisms that have the same role model are more likely to interact with each other than with a randomly selected member of the population.
  • evolution of preferences, kin selection, altruism, prisoners' dilemma,
  • RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:1993b
Language
  • English
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